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FOREWORD 
Low f e r t i l i t y  l e v e l s  i n  many c o u n t r i e s  a r e  c r e a t i n g  a g i n g  
p o p u l a t i o n s  whose demands f o r  h e a l t h  c a r e  and income maintenance  
( s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y )  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t o  unpreceden ted  l e v e l s ,  t h e r e b y  
c a l l i n g  f o r t h  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  w i l l  promote i n c r e a s e d  f a m i l y  c a r e  
and w o r k l i f e  f l e x i b i l i t y .  The P o p u l a t i o n  Program a t  IIASA i s  
examining c u r r e n t  p a t t e r n s  o f  p o p u l a t i o n ' a g i n g  and chang ing  
l i f e - s t y l e s ,  p r o j e c t i n g  t h e  needs  f o r  h e a l t h  and income s u p p o r t  
t h a t  such p a t t e r n s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  g e n e r a t e  d u r i n g  t h e  n e x t  s e v e r a l  
d e c a d e s ,  and  c o n s i d e r i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  f a m i l y  and employment p o l i -  
cies t h a t  might  r e d u c e  t h e  s o c i a l  c o s t s  o f  mee t ing  t h e s e  needs .  
The program i s  s e e k i n g  t o  d e v e l o p  a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
o f  how f e r t i l i t y  and m o r t a l i t y  combine t o  c r e a t e  a g i n g  popula-  
t i o n s ,  w i t h  h i g h  demands f o r  h e a l t h  and income main tenance ,  and 
reduced  f a m i l y  s u p p o r t  sys tems  t h a t  can  p r o v i d e  t h a t  ma in tenance .  
The r e s e a r c h  w i l l  produce  a n a l y s e s  of c u r r e n t  demographic p a t -  
t e r n s ,  p r i m a r i l y  i n  IIASA c o u n t r i e s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a n  a s s e s s -  
ment o f  t h e i r  p r o b a b l e  f u t u r e  s o c i e t a l  consequences  and i m p a c t s  
on t h e  a g i n g .  I t  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  e l d e r l y  
w i t h i n  chang ing  f a m i l y  s t r u c t u r e s ,  r ev iew n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  
t h a t  promote a n  e n l a r g e d  r o l e  f o r  f a m i l y  c a r e ,  and examine t h e  
c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  sys tems  f o r  e n c o u r a g i n g  work- 
l i f e  f l e x i b i l i t y  by t r a n s f e r r i n g  income between d i f f e r e n t  p e r i o d s  
o f  l i f e .  
The q u e s t i o n  o f  a g i n g ,  h e a l t h  c a r e ,  and s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  was 
a d d r e s s e d  i n  one  o f  t h e  s e s s i o n s  o f  a  c o n f e r e n c e  on h e a l t h  c a r e  
i n  MOSCOW, o r g a n i z e d  by t h e  S o v i e t  M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a l t h  and IIASA. 
The t h r e e  e s s a y s  c o l l e c t e d  h e r e  were p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h a t  s e s s i o n .  
They d e a l  w i t h  t h e  r i s i n g  c o s t  of  h e a l t h  c a r e ,  u s i n g  t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  a s  a n  example; t h e  r o l e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  p l a y s  i n  t h e  
economies o f  deve loped  c o u n t r i e s ;  and t h e  impac t  o f  r a p i d l y  
a g i n g  p o p u l a t i o n s  on p u b l i c  programs,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  h e a l t h  c a r e .  
A l i s t  o f  r e l a t e d  IIASA p u b l i c a t i o n s  a p p e a r s  a t  t h e  end 
o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  e s s a y s .  
Andre i  Rogers 
Leader  
P o p u l a t i o n  Program 
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HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES AND SYSTEMS OF COST CONTROL 
Uwe E. Reinhard t ,  P ro fe s so r  of  Economics 
and P u b l i c  A f f a i r s  
Woodrow W i l s o n  Sch.ool, P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y ,  
P r i n c e t o n ,  New J e r s e y ,  USA 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout t h e  Western market economies -- and poss ib ly  
i n  t h e  S o c i a l i s t  r e p u b l i c s  a s  w e l l  -- t h e  s h a r e  of n a t i o n a l  
r e sou rces  claimed by t h e  p rov i s ion  of h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  has  
r i s e n  r a p i d l y  i n  t h e  l a s t  two decades.  Table 1 and F igures  
1 and 2 c h r o n i c l e  t h i s  development f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  a  
n a t i o n  t h a t  main ta ins  probably t h e  most d e t a i l e d  accounts  of 
expendi tures .  
I t  i s  seen  t h a t  roughly 10 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  
g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  product  (GNP) i s  c u r r e n t l y  absorbed by t h e  
p rov i s ion  of  h e a l t h  c a r e .  That r a t i o  i s  expected t o  r i s e  
t o  roughly 1 1  pe rcen t  by t h e  end of t h i s  decade ( s e e  Table 1 ) .  
The comparable r a t i o  i n  1960 was on ly  5 . 3  pe rcen t .  I n  view 
of t h e  gradua l  ag ing  of  t h e  US popula t ion  ( a  s u b j e c t  d e a l t  
w i th  i n  dep th  by my co l l eague  D r .  Wilensky) and i n  view of 
t h e  probable  f u r t h e r  development of r e sou rce - in t ens ive ,  new 
medical technology,  it i s  reasonable  t o  suppose t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  
w i l l  r i s e  beyond 1 1  pe rcen t  dur ing  t h e  1990s. That p rospec t  
i s  viewed by many Americans a s  a  source  of  concern,  a s  r e sou rce  
a l l o c a t i o n s  t o  h e a l t h  c a r e  compete wi th  p o t e n t i a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  
of  r e sou rces  t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  s o c i a l  o b j e c t i v e s .  A t  t h i s  t ime ,  
Table 1. Share of US resources allocated to health services, 1929-1990. 
Aggregate and Per Capita Natlonal Health Expendltures, by Sourca oi Funds and Percant of Gross Natlonal P roduc t  
Selected Calendar Years, 1929-1 990 
He8lln iro.nollur8r 
&on ia l r l  Ff~vala ~ U O I I C  
N*llonU TOUI ceaerml stale rna coca1 
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Figure  2 .  Nat iona l  h e a l t h  expend i tu re s  and g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  
p roduc t :  growth and r e l a t i v e  s i z e s ,  1966-1981. 
SOURCE : Gibson and Waldo 1982, p. 3 .  
t h e  n a t i o n  i s  given t o  an i n t e n s e  deba te  over  f u t u r e  po l i cy  on 
h e a l t h  c a r e ,  a  deba t e  appa ren t ly  p a r a l l e l e d  e lsewhere  i n  t h e  
Western n a t i o n s .  
2 .  SOURCES OF COST GROWTH 
For many y e a r s  du r ing  t h e  l a t e r  1960s and e a r l y  1970s, 
Americans were i n c l i n e d  t o  view t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e i r  o u t l a y s  
on h e a l t h  c a r e  a s  a  uniquely  American phenomenon. I t  was 
thought  -- and i s  s t i l l  widely be l i eved  -- t h a t  one of t h e  
major d r i v e r s  behind t h e  phenomenon was t h e  g radua l  removal 
of f i n a n c i a l  b a r r i e r s  t o  h e a l t h  c a r e .  I n  t h e i r  N a t i o n a l  
Hea l th  E x p e n d i t u r e s :  Short-Term OutZook and Long-Term 
P r o j e c t i o n s  a r t i c l e ,  f o r  example, Freeland and Schendler (1981) 
o f f e r  t h e  fo l lowing  obse rva t ion :  
Fac to r s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  r a p i d  growth i n  n a t i o n a l  
h e a l t h  expend i tu re s  a r e  numerous and i n t e r r e l a t e d .  
The i n t e r p l a y  of  demand i n c e n t i v e s  and supply in -  
c e n t i v e s  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  growth of s p e c i f i c  t ypes  
of medical expend i tu re s .  Two f a c t o r s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
a r e  noteworthy: 1 )  a  demand-side f a c t o r ,  t h e  r o l e  
of t h i r d - p a r t y  payments i n  i n c r e a s i n g  consumer demand 
f o r  s e r v i c e s ;  and 2 )  a  supply-s ide  f a c t o r ,  t h e  fee-  
f o r - s e r v i c e  and cost -based reimbursement systems which 
l ack  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  provide medical  c a r e  i n  t h e  l e a s t  
expensive manner (p .115) .  
By "cost-based reimbursement" i n  t h i s  con tex t  t h e  a u t h o r s  r e f e r  
t o  t h e  wide-spread p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  of re imburs ing 
i n p a t i e n t  f a c i l i t i e s  on a  r e t r o s p e c t i 2 e  f u Z I - c o s t  b a s i s ,  a  
method t h a t  c l e a r l y  does  l ack  any b u i l t - i n  mechanism f o r  a s su r -  
i n g  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
F igure  3 i n d i c a t e s  t h e  growth of t h i r d - p a r t y  payment f o r  
h e a l t h  c a r e  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  I t  i s  seen  t h a t  t h i r d - p a r t y  
payment ( p r i v a t e  and p u b l i c  h e a l t h  i n su rance )  now accounts  f o r  
about  two-thi rds  of  t o t a l  n a t i o n a l  expend i tu re s  f o r  h e a l t h  c a r e ,  
up from about  50 pe rcen t  i n  1965. Government sou rces  a lone  
account f o r  about  one - th i rd  of t o t a l  n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  expend i tu re s .  
I Pr~vate Health Insurance I 
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F i g u r e  3 .  P e r c e n t a g e  s h a r e s  o f  e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  p e r s o n a l  h e a l t h  
care, 1965-1980.  
SOURCE : G i b s o n  a n d  Waldo 1 9 8 1 ,  p .  6 .  
Even S O ,  rough ly  o n e - t h i r d  o f  a l l  p e r s o n a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on 
h e a l t h  c a r e  a r e  s t i l l  p a i d  d i r e c t l y  by consumers a t  t h e  t i m e  
s e r v i c e s  a r e  r e c e i v e d ,  a  f i g u r e  p robab ly  h i g h e r  t han  seems 
widely  supposed among t h e  p u b l i c .  
A s  i s  shown i n  F i g u r e  4 ,  t h e  degree  o f  d i r e c t  c o s t - s h a r i n g  
by p a t i e n t s  v a r i e s  by t y p e  of h e a l t h  s e r v i c e .  I n p a t i e n t  ser- 
v i c e s  rendered  by h o s p i t a l s  ( exc lud ing  p h y s i c i a n  s e r v i c e s  ren-  
dered t h e r e )  a r e  more o r  less f u l l y  covered by t h i r d - p a r t y  
p a y e r s .  By c o n t r a s t ,  a l l  o t h e r  h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  a r e  much less 
t h a n  f u l l y  covered.  For  p h y s i c i a n  s e r v i c e s  o f  a l l  t y p e s  ( i n -  
c l u d i n g  p h y s i c i a n  s e r v i c e s  rendered  i n  t h e  h o s p i t a l )  p a t i e n t s  
now pay an average  of  rough ly  one - th i rd  d i r e c t l y  o u t  o f  pocke t ,  
a  r a t i o  t h a t  rises t o  rough ly  60  p e r c e n t  f o r  s t r i c t l y  ambula- 
t o r y  p h y s i c i a n  c a r e  (see Table  2 ) .  For  d rugs  and medica l  a p p l i -  
ances  and d e n t a l  c a r e ,  t h i r d - p a r t y  payment i s  s t i l l  r e l a t i v e l y  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  
There i s  p e r s u a s i v e  e m p i r i c a l  ev idence  a t  t h e  microeconomic 
l e v e l  t h a t ,  o t h e r  t h i n g s  be ing  e q u a l ,  t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of  h e a l t h  
s e r v i c e s  by p a t i e n t s ,  and t h e  t o t a l  o u t l a y  on h e a l t h  c a r e  t hey  
o c c a s i on ,  i s  n e g a t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  t h e  deg ree  o f  c o s t -  
s h a r i n g  a t  p o i n t  o f  s e r v i c e  (see, f o r  example, Newhouse e t  a l .  
1981) .  The r e s u l t s  from formal  e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  on t h e  i s s u e  
conform w e l l  w i t h  common s e n s e .  I t  i s  less w e l l  known how t h i s  
b e h a v i o r  a t  t h e  microeconomic l e v e l  t r a n s l a t e s  i t s e l f  i n t o  over-  
a l l  n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  I t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  suppose 
t h a t ,  i f  t h e  aged and t h e  poor  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  were n o t  
covered by pub l ic ly - funded  h e a l t h  i n s u r a n c e  programs ( a s ,  i n  
f a c t ,  t h ey  a r e )  t h en  o v e r a l l  h e a l t h  c a r e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  t h e  
United S t a t e s  would be l i k e l y  t o  be  somewhat lower t han  t hey  
a r e  now. On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  it does  n o t  f o l l o w  from t h i s  
h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  absence  of c o s t - s h a r i n g  by p a t i e n t s  ne- 
c e s s a r i l y  drives up o v e r a l l  h e a l t h  c a r e  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  because  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  can r e a d i l y  
s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  economic i n c e n t i v e s  toward t h e  same end.  

Table 2. Percentage of health expenditure paid out of pocket 
(sample of 14,000 US families). 
Type of service 
Third-party 
Family (insurance, etc . ) 
Ambulatory physician 
care 
A11 physician services 34 
Dental services 80 
Prescribed medicine 80 
Repair of glasses and 
contact lenses 
Medical appliances and 
supplies 
Inpatient hospital services 12 
(exc. physician care) 
SOURCE: Kasper et al. 1980. 
To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o i n t ,  Table 3 p r e s e n t s  a  ( n e c e s s a r i l y  
cursory)  synops i s  of t h e  h e a l t h  insurance  systems i n  t h r e e  
c o u n t r i e s  wi th  which t h e  United S t a t e s  can be  reasonably  com- 
pared:  Canada, France,  and West Germany. A l l  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s  
have more e x t e n s i v e  h e a l t h  insurance  coverage than  does t h e  
United S t a t e s  and y e t ,  none of them devotes  a  g r e a t e r  propor- 
t i o n  of t h e i r  GNP t o  h e a l t h  c a r e  than  does t h e  United S t a t e s .  
On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  bo th  France and Canada appear  t o  devote  a  
cons iderab ly  sma l l e r  p ropor t ion  of t h e i r  G N P  t o  h e a l t h  c a r e  
than does t h e  US. Even West Germany, whose h e a l t h  insurance  
system is  i n c r e d i b l y  e x t e n s i v e  and generous by US s t a n d a r d s ,  
devotes  only  about  t h e  same percen tage  of GNP t o  h e a l t h  c a r e  
a s  does t h e  US. 
F igures  5 and 6 sharpen t h i s  pe rcep t ion .  By and l a r g e ,  
t h e  r e c e n t  annual  growth i n  n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  c a r e  expendi tures  
and t h e  c u r r e n t  l e v e l  of t h e s e  expend i tu re s  i s  n o t  w e l l  ex- 
p l a ined  by t h e  degree  of h e a l t h  i n su rance  coverage i n  t h e  
va r ious  n a t i o n s .  I f  t h e r e  i s  one dominant f a c t o r  i n f l u e n c i n g  
t h e  percen tage  of  G N P  a  n a t i o n  devotes  t o  h e a l t h  c a r e  -- cer -  
t a i n l y  i n  t h e  Western market economies -- it appears  t o  be t h e  
average r e a l  pe r  c a p i t a  income i n  t h e  n a t i o n  (see Figures  7 
and 8 ) .  I t  would be  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  know t o  what e x t e n t  t h i s  
phenomenon i s  p a r a l l e l e d  i n  t h e  S o c i a l i s t  r e p u b l i c s .  Q u i t e  
probably t h e  phenomenon of  r a p i d  growth i n  n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  
c a r e  expendi tures  is  impervious n o t  on ly  t o  d i f f e r e n t  forms 
of h e a l t h  i n su rance  w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  r e l a t i v e l y  homo- 
geneous Western democracies ,  b u t  a l s o  t o  more s u b s t a n t i a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  p o l i t i c a l  systems. 
3. POLICIES TO CONSTRAIN THE GROWTH OF HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES 
A s  a l r eady  no ted ,  p o l i c y  makers i n  t h e  Western n a t i o n s  have 
come t o  view t h e  p e r s i s t e n t  r a p i d  growth of  h e a l t h  c a r e  expendi- 
t u r e s  a s  an economic t h r e a t .  S ince  about t h e  mid 1970s, when 
t h i s  pe rcep t ion  f i r m l y  took r o o t s  i n  o f f i c i a l  t h i n k i n g ,  t h e r e  
have been numerous a t t empt s  t o  i n t roduce  measures t h a t  might 
-11- 
Table  3 .  Overview of  n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  i n s u r a n c e  sys tems .  
SOURCE: Reinhardt 1980. 
a/Outlays under the statutory health insurance system only. 
VEST G E M  
A mosaic of  o v e r  1.500 
s i c k n e s s  funds orga-  
n i z e d  i n  s t a t e -  and 
n a t i o n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
and o p e r a t i n g  v x t h i n  
f e d e r a l  s t a t u t e s .  
Covers some 7 p e r c e n t  
of t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  f o r  
b a s i c  b e n e f i t s .  
The s t a t u t o r y  system 
covers  93 percenc  of 
t h e  popula t ion .  Some 
7 p e r c e n t  has p r i v a t e  
coverage: 1 percenc  
has no coverage. 
Uedical  s e r v i c e s .  
h o s p i t a l  s e r v i c e s ,  
d e n t a l  c a r e .  
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cash  b e n e f i t s .  
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H o s p i t a l  phvs.: s a l a r y  
P r i v a t e  phys.: fee-  
f o r - s e r v i c e  
A p a y r o l l  t a x  of about  
11% of ea rnrngs  s h a r e d  
e q u a l l v  by employer 
and employee. 
There is v i r t u a l l y  no 
c o s t  s h a r i n g  excep t  
f o r  a  modest co- 
payment pe r  p r e s c r i p -  
t i o n .  
1970-75: ~ 0 . 1 % ~ '  
a  / 1975-76: 9.8%- 
1976-77: 4.8% 
d / 1977-78: 7.1%- 
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CANAM 
Ten independent  pro- 
v i n c i a l  medical  and 
h o s p i t a l  p l a n s  opera t -  
ing  v i c h i n  f e d e r a l  
g u i d e l i n e s  and v i t h  
f e d e r a l  c o s t  s h a r i n g .  
Confined t o  p ro-  
v i s i o n  of  supp le -  
menta l  coverage. 
P u b l i c  system pro-  
v i d e s  u n i v e r s a l  
coverage on e q u a l  
tern. 
Uedica l  s e r p i c u  . 
h o s p i t a l  s e r v i c e s .  
f o r  s p e c i a l  groups: 
d e n t a l  c a r e .  
drugs.  
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Phys ic ian :  fee-for- 
s e r v i c e  reimbursement 
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about  50% of  c o s t s .  
O r i g i n a l l y  r a r e .  In- 
c r e a s i n g  somewhat i n  
p rov inces  c h a t  per- 
m i t  phys ic ians  t o  
o p t  o u t  of t h e  system. 
1971-74: 12.1% 
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A n a t i o n a l  system of 
s i c k n e s s  funds orga- 
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v i s i o n  of  supple-  
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o f  t h e  populat ion.  
Uedica l  s e r v i c e s .  
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tax:  about  3.5% of  
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Coinsurance r a t e  of  
between 30% t o  zero.  
depending on s e v e r i t y  
o f  i l l n e s s .  
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Figure 5. Secular growth in health care expenditures. 
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Figure 6. Health care expenditures and cost sharing. 










Share of Gross Domestic Product spent on medical care = 
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Figure 8. Relationship between gross domestic product and share spent on medical care 
in 13 countries (recent years). 
SOURCE : Newhouse 1976. 
c o n s t r a i n  t h e  f u t u r e  growth of t h e s e  o u t l a y s .  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  
I s h a l l  review t h e s e  measures b r i e f l y ,  w i th  p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis 
on t h e  approach c u r r e n t l y  be ing  debated i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
Before doing s o ,  however, it may be w e l l  t o  exp lo re  j u s t  why 
expend i tu re s  on h e a l t h  c a r e  a r e  so widely viewed wi th  misg iv ings .  
3.1 .  The Ra t iona l e  f o r  Cost-Containment i n  Heal th  Care 
One commonly c i t e d  reason  f o r  cost -containment  p o l i c i e s  
i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  is  t h a t  s u s t a i n e d  r a p i d  growth i n  h e a l t h  ex- 
pend i tu re s  would l e a d  a n a t i o n ' s  economy t o  t h e  b r i n k  of eco- 
nomic r u i n .  By t h e  t e n o r  of  i t s  language,  t h i s  i s  a macra- 
economic argument. The argument appears  t o  imply t h a t  h e a l t h  
c a r e  expend i tu re s  come a t  t h e  expense of c a p i t a l  format ion.  
On t h e  t h e s i s  t h a t  c a p i t a l  format ion i s  t h e  s i n e  qua non of  
economic growth, it i s  thought  t h a t  c u r r e n t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  h e a l t h  
c a r e  expend i tu re s  come a t  t h e  expense of f u t u r e  g e n e r a t i o n s .  
How compell ing i s  t h i s  argument? 
Frankly,  t h e  argument s t r i k e s  m e  a s  a p e c u l i a r  one t o  
o f f e r  i n  t i m e s  of t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  high unemployment now plaguing 
t h e  Western market  economies. I n  such an environment, t h e  
macro-economist 's n a t u r a l  p o s t u r e  should be t o  c e l e b r a t e  con- 
sumer expend i tu re s ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of  t h e i r  purpose.  Indeed,  it 
i s  f o r  p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  reason  t h a t  p o l i c y  makers t y p i c a l l y  cheer  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  consumer expend i tu re s  on,  s a y ,  automobi les  o r  
hoola-hoops a s  s i g n s  of economic h e a l t h ,  f u l l y  recogniz ing  
t h a t  expend i tu re s  on automobi les  p l a c e  a mortgage on our  phy- 
s i c a l  h e a l t h ,  on t h e  s a f e t y  of ou r  environment, on our  energy 
r e s e r v e s ,  on our  f o r e i g n  r e se rves , and  on ou r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  
B lun t ly  p u t ,  it can be asked why added employment c r e a t e d  
through t h e  manufacture of  automobiles o r  p l a s t i c  t oys  i s  s o  
s o  much t o  be p r e f e r r e d  t o  added employment c r e a t e d  through 
t h e  d e l i v e r y  o f ,  s a y ,  a d d i t i o n a l  h o s p i t a l  days.  I f  h e a l t h  
c a r e  expend i tu re s  do d i v e r t  r e sou rces  from c a p i t a l  format ion*,  
* 
Actua l ly ,  n o t  a l l  h e a l t h  c a r e  expendi tures  a r e  consumption i n  
t h e  f i r s t  p l ace .  A good many of t h e s e  expendi tures  a r e  bona 
f i d e  investments i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  of people  and i n  t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  t o  enjoy l i f e  i n  f u t u r e  y e a r s .  
one could s u r e l y  t h ink  of numerous o t h e r ,  more f r i v o l o u s  con- 
sumption expendi tures--  e . g . ,  f a s h i o n ,  o r  a l c o h o l  and tobacco 
-- t h a t  a l s o  d i v e r t  r e sou rces  from c a p i t a l  format ion and t h a t  
seem s e n s i b l e  t a r g e t s  f o r  c o n s t r a i n t s  on consumption. I n  s h o r t ,  
t hen ,  from a  s t r i c t l y  macroeconomic viewpoint ,  t h e  need t o  
c o n s t r a i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  expendi tures  i s  no more compell ing -- 
and perhaps l e s s  s o  -- than  would be t h e  c o n s t r a i n i n g  of many 
o t h e r  expend i tu re s .  
An a l t e r n a t i v e  response t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o r i g i n a l l y  r a i s e d  
may be t h a t ,  wh i l e  h e a l t h  c a r e  expend i tu re s  a r e  n o t  a  t h r e a t  t o  
a  n a t i o n ' s  economy from a  macroeconomic v iewpoin t ,  they  do n o t  
f a l l  unevenly and c a p r i c i o u s l y  on t h e  budgets of i n d i v i d u a l  house- 
ho lds ,  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ,  o r  s t a t e  and f e d e r a l  agenc ies .  To be 
s u r e ,  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  t h e s e  l o c a l  budget  c r i s e s  a r e  very 
r e a l  and p a i n f u l ,  and they  may be troublesome i n  o t h e r  n a t i o n s  
a s  we l l .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e s e  expend i tu re  f lows could be 
c o l l e c t i v i z e d  under a  t r u l y  n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  insurance  system. 
I n  t h e  process  t h e  c r i s i s  might l a r g e l y  d i sappea r  a l t o g e t h e r .  
The budget argument, t h e n ,  does n o t  s t r i k e  me a s  very compell ing 
e i t h e r  . 
The problem, of  course ,  i s  t h a t  a  n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  i n su rance  
system t ends  t o  d i s t o r t  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  b e n e f i t - c o s t  c a l c u l u s  
normally a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  consumption expend i tu re s .  I t  i s  wide- 
l y  app rec i a t ed  t h a t  t h i r d - p a r t y  payment reduces  o r  e l i m i n a t e s  
t h e  consumer's i n c e n t i v e  t o  observe economy i n  t h e  use  of h e a l t h  
c a r e  r e sou rces .  When h e a l t h  c a r e  i s  completely f r e e  t o  t h e  con- 
sumer, he  o r  she  may u t i l i z e  h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  beyond t h e  p o i n t  
a t  which t h e  b e n e f i t s  he o r  she d e r i v e s  from t h e s e  h e a l t h  s e r -  
v i c e s  j u s t i f y  t h e  c o s t  of r e sou rces  expended on t h e s e  s e r v i c e s .  
A t  t h e  same t ime,  t h e  reimbursement systems favored by most 
Western n a t i o n s  g ive  h e a l t h  c a r e  producers  ( h o s p i t a l s ,  physi-  
c i a n s ,  nurs ing  homes, and s o  on) cons ide rab le  power t o  d e t e r -  
mine t h e i r  t a k e  from t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  t r e a s u r y .  This  phenomenon 
i s  n o t  p r e v a l e n t  i n  t h e  consumption of a l coho l  o r  c h i l d r e n ' s  
toys .  While we may dep lo re  t h e  use of a l c o h o l  on medical  o r  
s o c i o l o g i c a l  grounds,  we a r e  n o t  concerned over  n a t i o n a l  ex- 
pend i tu re s  on a l c o h o l ,  tobacco,  o r  f a sh ion  p r e c i s e l y  because 
( a )  t h e s e  expend i tu re s  a r e  n o t  c o l l e c t i v e l y  f i nanced ,  and 
( b )  they  a r e  determined by a  s e r i e s  of vo lun ta ry ,  i n d i v i d u a l  
exchanges between consen t ing  a d u l t s  who a r e  u s u a l l y  capable  
of  a s s e s s i n g  t h e i r  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e s e  
exchanges. I n  a  market  economy one imputes economic l e g i t i -  
macy t o  such exchanges. 
I n  s h o r t ,  t h e n ,  our  sense  of c r i s i s  i n  connect ion wi th  
h e a l t h  c a r e  expend i tu re s  s t r i k e s  me i n  t h e  main a s  a  loss of 
f a i t h  i n  t h e  economic l eg i t imacy  of  t h e  process  determining 
t h e  l e v e l  of t h e s e  expend i tu re s .  The problem i s  no t  t r u l y  
one of macroeconomics, nor need i t  be a  budgetary one. It 
i s  a  bene f i t - cos t  c r i s i s .  
Underlying t h i s  view i s  t h e  no t ion  t h a t  t h e  h e a l t h  s t a t u s  
of i n d i v i d u a l s  -- and t h e  corresponding agg rega t e  measures f o r  
e n t i r e  n a t i o n s  -- i s  a func t ion  of a  l a r g e  s e t  of  i n p u t s  (nu- 
t r i t i o n ,  hygiene,  l i f e - s t y l e ,  medical  c a r e ,  e t c . )  of  which 
h e a l t h  c a r e  i s  b u t  one p a r t i c u l a r  type .  Furthermore,  it  i s  
reasonable  t o  assume t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  d imin ish ing  marginal  re -  
t u r n s  t o  any p a r t i c u l a r  i n p u t ,  h e a l t h  c a r e  inc luded .  F igure  9  
d e p i c t s  t h i s  h y p o t h e t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  diagrammatical ly .  With- 
o u t  denying t h a t  some i n d i v i d u a l s  s t i l l  f i n d  themselves i n  t h e  
upward s lop ing  segment of t h e  h e a l t h  p roduc t ion  f u n c t i o n  ( s a y ,  
a t  p o i n t  B), one can hypothes ize  t h a t  many i n d i v i d u a l s  a l s o  
f i n d  themselves i n  t h e  f l a t  o r  even t h e  n e g a t i v e l y  s loped  por.- 
t i o n  of t h e  curve ( e . g . ,  a t  p o i n t s  A, D ,  or  E). To t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  such i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  f u l l y  i n s u r e d ,  t h e r e  i s  r e a l l y  no 
mechanism t o  f o r c e  them i n t o  a  c a r e f u l  assessment  of t h e  bene- 
f i t s  y i e l d e d  by f u r t h e r  h e a l t h  c a r e  expendi tures .  I f  improved 
h e a l t h  s t a t u s  i s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  o b j e c t i v e ,  then  changes i n  l i f e  
s t y l e ,  o r  expend i tu re s  on improved hygiene o r  n u t r i t i o n  might 
be much more p roduc t ive  than added o u t l a y s  on h e a l t h  c a r e .  I n  
terms of  F igure  9 ,  it may be  much more c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  t o  s h i f t  
up t h e  e n t i r e  curve ( s a y ,  t o  p o i n t  C ) ,  r a t h e r  than  t o  move a long 
t h e  curve.  

Sooner o r  l a t e r  a lmost  a l l  d i s c u s s i o n  on t h e  m e r i t s  o r  
demer i t s  of cost -containment  i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  a r e  d r i v e n  t o  t h i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  There r a r e l y  eve r  i s  t h e  i n t e n t  i n  t h e s e  d i s -  
cus s ions  t o  dep r ive  i n d i v i d u a l s  of  p o t e n t i a l l y  p roduc t ive  h e a l t h  
c a r e  consumption. Unfor tuna te ly ,  of cou r se ,  t h e  absence of  t h a t  
i n t e n t  does  no t  guaran tee  one t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  cost-containment 
measures w i l l  n o t  have t h a t  undes i red  e f f e c t  i n  p r a c t i c e .  
3.2. Cost-Containment S t r a t e g i e s  
A s  noted e a r l i e r ,  s i n c e  about t h e  mid 1970s most Western 
na t ions  have sought t o  c o n s t r a i n  t h e  growth of h e a l t h  c a r e  
expendi tures  through o v e r t  p u b l i c  po l i cy .  The form of t h i s  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  has  v a r i e d  from country  t o  coun t ry ,  i n  l i n e  wi th  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework through which p u b l i c  p o l i c i e s  must 
work. The e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t  goa l  of t h e s e  p o l i c i e s ,  however, 
has tended t o  be i d e n t i c a l :  t o  peg t h e  growth of n a t i o n a l  
h e a l t h  expendi tures  t o  t h e  growth of g ros s  n a t i o n a l  p roduc t ,  
a t  l e a s t  over  t h e  long run .  That  goa l  i s ,  of cou r se ,  a r b i -  
t r a r y .  There i s  no empi r i ca l  suppor t  f o r  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
a  s o c i e t y  e i t h e r  should o r  would p r e f e r  t o  a l l o c a t e  a  c o n s t a n t  
p ropor t ion  of i t s  r e sou rce  budget t o  a  oommodity such a s  h e a l t h  
c a r e .  I f  t h e  p a s t  i s  any gu ide ,  s o c i e t i e s  g e n e r a l l y  choose t o  
a l l o c a t e  an i n c r e a s i n g  p ropor t ion  of GNPtD h e a l t h  c a r e  a s  GNP 
p e r  c a p i t a  grows (see Figures  7  and 8 ) .  Why t h i s  t r e n d  should 
be a r r e s t e d  now through p u b l i c  p o l i c y  r e q u i r e s  f u r t h e r  thought .  
A f t e r  a l l ,  even i f  t h e  annual  growth i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  expendi tures  
were t o  outpace t h e  annual  growth of a  n a t i o n ' s  GNP i n  t h e  fo re -  
s e e a b l e  f u t u r e ,  it does no t  fo l low t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  s t anda rd  
of l i v i n g  (measured i n  terms of non-health G N P )  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  
f a l l  below c u r r e n t  l e v e l s .  Table 4 speaks t o  t h i s  p o i n t .  
I n  Table 4 it i s  assumed t h a t  GNP i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  
w i l l  grow from i t s  nominal l e v e l  of $2,626 b i l l i o n  i n  1980 a t  
a  nominal annual  growth r a t e  of 9 p e r c e n t  ( o r  a  r e a l ,  i n f l a t i o n  
ad jus t ed  growth r a t e  of 3  pe rcen t  pe r  y e a r )  . Row A of t h e  
t a b l e  shows t h e  percen tage  of GNP going t o  h e a l t h  c a r e  on t h e  
assumption t h a t  t o t a l  h e a l t h  c a r e  expendi tures  grow a t  r a t e s  
T a b l e  4. P r o j e c t e d  i m p a c t  o f  h e a l t h  care e x p e n d i t u r e s  o n  n o n - h e a l t h  GNP 
p e r  c a p i t a :  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  1980-2000. 
Assumed a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  g rowth  ( i n  p e r c e n t  
i n  nomina l  h e a l t h  care e x p e n d i t u r e s  (nomina l  
GNP assumed t o  grow a t  9% p e r  y e a r )  
A.  H e a l t h  care e x p e n d i t u r e s  as 9.4 14.0 20.9 31.2 
p e r c e n t  o f  GNP i n  t h e  y e a r  
2000 
B. Average  a n n u a l  g rowth  i n  
real n o n - h e a l t h  GNP p e r  
c a p i t a ,  i n  1 9 7 6  doZZars 
C. T o t a l  p e r c e n t a g e  i n c r e a s e  52 
( o v e r  t h e  two d e c a d e s )  i n  
real  n o n - h e a l t h  GNP p e r  
c a p i t a  
ASSUMPTIONS: Nominal GNP w i l l  i n c r e a s e  a t  a n  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  ra te  o f  9  p e r c e n t  
f rom i t s  b a s e - y e a r  v a l u e  o f  $2 ,626  b i l l i o n  i n  1980. T o t a l  h e a l t h  
care e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n  t h a t  y e a r  w e r e  $247.2 b i l l i o n  or  9.4 p e r -  
c e n t  o f  GNP. The g e n e r a l  p r i c e  l eve l  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  a t  a n  a v e r a g e  
a n n u a l  rate  o f  6  p e r c e n t  and  t h e  US p o p u l a t i o n  i s  assumed t o  grow 
a t  a n  a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  0 .9  p e r c e n t ,  f rom a  b a s e  o f  231.7 m i l l i o n  i n  
1980.  A l l  growth  rates are i n s t a n t a n e o u s  (compounded c o n t i n u o u s l y ) .  
of 9 ,  11, o r  13 p e r c e n t  p e r  y e a r  du r ing  t h e  p e r i o d  1980-2000 
from t h e  1980 l e v e l  of $247.2 b i l l i o n .  Row B i n d i c a t e s  t h e  
annual  growth r a t e  i n  r e a l ,  non-health GNP p e r  c a p i t a  c o r r e s -  
ponding t o  t h e s e  growth r a t e s  i n  h e a l t h  expend i tu re s  (on t h e  
assumption t h a t  t h e  US popula t ion  w i l l  con t inue  t o  grow a t  
an average annual  r a t e  of 0.9 p e r c e n t ) .  I t  i s  seen  t h a t  even 
i f  t h e  growth of nominal h e a l t h  c a r e  expend i tu re s  exceeds t h e  
growth of nominal GNP by 4 percen tage  p o i n t s ,  r e a l  non-health 
GNP pe r  c a p i t a l  would s t i l l  grow a t  an average annual  r a t e  of 
c l o s e  t o  1 p e r c e n t .  I n  o t h e r  words, evenas d r a s t i c  a  growth 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  a s  13 p e r c e n t  ( i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  expend i tu re s )  versus  
9  pe rcen t  ( i n  G N P )  would n o t  e x a c t l y  s t a r v e  t h e  n a t i o n  i n  terms 
of  non-health G N P .  
Figure  10 p r e s e n t s  a  broad menu of p o t e n t i a l  t a r g e t s  f o r  
cost-containment s t r a t e g i e s .  The u l t i m a t e  t a r g e t  of such p o l i -  
c i e s  t ends  t o  be A -- t o t a l  h e a l t h  c a r e  expend i tu re s .  Targe ts  
B ,  C ,  and D a r e  merely i n t e r v e n i n g  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  p a r t i a l l y  
determine t a r g e t  A.  
The most s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  method of  c o n s t r a i n i n g  t h e  growth 
o f  h e a l t h  expend i tu re s  t o  t h e  growth of G N P  would be simply t o  
cap  t o t a l  expend i tu re s  ( t a r g e t  A ) .  This approach seems most 
p r a c t i c a l  i n  c e n t r a l l y  planned economies, and under t h e  B r i t i s h  
Nat iona l  Heal th  S e r v i c e .  I t  h a s ,  however, been a t tempted  e l s e -  
where a s  w e l l .  I n  t h e  West German s t a t e  of Bavar ia ,  f o r  example, 
a t t empts  have r e c e n t l y  been made t o  impose a  cap on t h e  t o t a l  
o u t l a y s  of t h e  s t a t u t o r y  h e a l t h  i n su rance  system o p e r a t i n g  i n  
t h a t  S t a t e  (Land) .  How e f f e c t i v e  t h i s  approach has  been remains 
t o  be s een .  The r e l a t i v e  success  of t h i s  so -ca l l ed  Bavarian 
P lan  i s  s t i l l  under review by t h e  r e s e a r c h  community. 
While i n  many of  t h e  Western economies t h e  h e a l t h  c a r e  
s e c t o r  i s  much too complex and t o o  d i f f u s e  t o  permit  t h e  imple- 
mentat ion of a  g l o b a l  cap on expend i tu re s ,  it may n e v e r t h e l e s s  
be p o s s i b l e  t o  cap t h e  flow of  funds t o  p a r t i c u l a r  s e c t o r s  o r  
t o  p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( t a r g e t s  A1 and A 2  i n  F igure  1 0 ) .  
I n  Canada, f o r  example, t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  h o s p i t a l  is  t y p i c a l l y  
s u b j e c t  t o  g l o b a l ,  p r o s p e c t i v e  budget ing,  a  system t h a t  d i f f e r s  
A. TOTAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES 
1. Total expenditures on particular 
sectors (e. g. , ambulatory care) 
2. Tota l  revenues of particular pro- 
viders (e .g . ,  hospitals) 
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Figure 10. Potential targets of health care cost-containment 
policies. 
d r a s t i c a l l y  from t h e  r e t r o s p e c t i v e ,  f u l l - c o s t  reimbursement  of  
h o s p i t a l s  p r a c t i c e d  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  During h i s  t e r m  i n  
o f f i c e ,  former P r e s i d e n t  C a r t e r  d i d  a t t e m p t  u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  t o  
impose revenue  c a p s  on t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  h o s p i t a l s  i n  t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  a s  w e l l .  One of  t h e  main problems w i t h  such  c a p s ,  how- 
e v e r ,  i s  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  s h o r t  r u n  a t  l e a s t ,  t h e i r  i m p o s i t i o n  t e n d s  
t o  reward t h e  h i s t o r i c a l l y  i n e f f i c i e n t  h o s p i t a l  and pun i sh  t h e  
e f f i c i e n t  one.  
I f  c a p s  on t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o r  on t h e  f low o f  funds  t o  
i n d i v i d u a l  p r o v i d e r s  a r e  n o t  f e a s i b l e ,  one  may s e e k  t o  a f f e c t  
t o t a l  o u t l a y s  i n d i r e c t l y  by c o n s t r a i n i n g  t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  
h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  ( t a r g e t  B) o r  t h e i r  p r i c e s  ( t a r g e t  C ) .  F u r t h e r -  
more, i n  t a r g e t i n g  on t h e  p r i c e s  o f  h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  ( t a r g e t  C )  , 
one may e i t h e r  s e e k  t o  c o n s t r a i n  t h e s e  p r i c e s  d i r e c t l y  ( t h r o u g h  
imposed c e i l i n g s  on s c h e d u l e s  o f  f e e s ,  c h a r g e s  o r  p e r  d i e m s ) ,  
o r  one may r e a c h  benea th  t h e s e  o u t p u t  p r i c e s  by t a r g e t i n g  
d i r e c t l y  on t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  h e a l t h  
s e r v i c e s  [ i . e . ,  by a iming  a t  t a r g e t s  C1 ( i n p u t  q u a n t i t i e s ) ,  
t a r g e t s  C2 ( i n p u t  p r i c e s )  o r  t a r g e t s  C3 ( t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  
r e s o u r c e  u s e  and h e a l t h  c a r e  d e l i v e r y ) ] .  Thus, one may s e e k  
t o  c o n s t r a i n  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  p h y s i c i a n s  i n  a  c o u n t r y ,  l i m i t  t h e  
number o f  h o s p i t a l  b e d s ,  o r  p r e s c r i b e  maximum s t a f f i n g  r a t i o s  
f o r  h e a l t h  c a r e  f a c i l i t i e s  ( t a r g e t  C 1 ) .  A d d i t i o n a l l y  or  a l -  
t e r n a t i v e l y ,  one  may s e e k  t o  c o n s t r a i n  t h e  " p r i c e s "  o f  t h e s e  
i n p u t s  ( t a r g e t  C 2 )  . For  example,  it might  be  a t t e m p t e d  t o  
p l a c e d i r e c t  c o n t r o l s  on t h e  incomes o f  p h y s i c i a n s  and o t h e r  
t y p e s  o f  h e a l t h  manpower, o r  t o  c o n s t r a i n  t h e  p r i c e s  of  pharma- 
c e u t i c a l s  and of o t h e r  med ica l  s u p p l i e s .  F i n a l l y ,  a t t e m p t s  
may be  made t o  i n f l u e n c e  d i r e c t l y  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  h e a l t h  
c a r e  d e l i v e r y ,  w i t h  a n  e y e  towards  g r e a t e r  economy. For  exam- 
p l e ,  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  H e a l t h  Maintenance O r g a n i z a t i o n s  (HMOs)  i n  
t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s *  r e p r e s e n t  one o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  form w i d e l y  
* 
Broadly  s p e a k i n g ,  a n  HMO i s  a  combinat ion  o f  i n s u r a n c e  sys tem 
and i n t e g r a t e d  p r o v i d e r  f a c i l i t y .  P a t i e n t s  i n  t h e  HMO prepay 
a n  annua l  c a p i t a t i o n  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  which t h e  HMO promises  t o  
p r o v i d e  t h e  e n r o l l e e  w i t h  a l l  m e d i c a l l y  n e c e s s a r y  h e a l t h  ser- 
v i c e s  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r .  T y p i c a l l y ,  an  HMO owns o r  manages i t s  
own ambula tory  and i n p a t i e n t  f a c i l i t i e s .  
thought t o  y i e l d  o v e r a l l  economics i n  t h e  use of h e a l t h  c a r e  
resources  (mainly of h o s p i t a l  c a r e ) .  The de lega t ion  of t a s k s  
from phys ic ians  t o  non-physician manpower is another  p o t e n t i a l  
source of c o s t  sav ing  i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  (Targe t  C3) .  Pub l i c  
po l icy  could in f luence  t h e  degree of t a s k  de lega t ion  e i t h e r  
through d i r e c t  e d i c t  (p resc r ibed  s t a f f i n g  p a t t e r n s )  o r  by con- 
f r o n t i n g  h e a l t h  c a r e  providers  with  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  
de lega te  t a s k s  t o  t h e  l e a s t - c o s t ,  t e c h n i c a l l y  q u a l i f i e d  h e a l t h  
personnel .  
By and l a r g e ,  economists look wi th  a  jaundiced eye on 
a t tempts  t o  in f luence  o v e r a l l  h e a l t h  c a r e  expendi tures  through 
d i r e c t  c o n t r o l s  on t h e  v a r i a b l e s  l i s t e d  i n  Figure  1 0 .  More 
o f t e n  than n o t ,  such c o n t r o l s  a r e  circumvented and thereby 
t r i g g e r  unexpected and undes i rab le  s i d e  e f f e c t s .  Attempts 
t o  c o n s t r a i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  expendi tures  a r e  q u i t e  c o r r e c t l y  
perceived by phys ic ians  and o t h e r  h e a l t h  workers a s  a  d i r e c t  
a s s a u l t  upon t h e i r  income. One must t h e r e f o r e  expec t  t h e s e  
providers  t o  r e s i s t  cost-containment p o l i c i e s .  Where t h i s  
r e s i s t a n c e  cannot be brought t o  bear  d i r e c t l y  through t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  p rocess  -- a s  it o f t e n  i s  i n  p r a c t i c e  -- it can 
be o f f e r e d  through the  manipulation of t h e  in t e rven ing  v a r i -  
ab le s  shown i n  F igure  1 0 .  For example, w i t h i n  l i m i t s  physi-  
c i a n s  can coun te rac t  downward p res su re  on t h e i r  f e e s  through 
inc reases  i n  p resc r ibed  u t i l i z a t i o n  of h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s .  With- 
i n  l i m i t s ,  h o s p i t a l s  can s t r e t c h  o u t  average l eng th  of s t a y  
t o  n e u t r a l i z e  c e i l i n g s  on t h e i r  per  diem charges .  Although 
t h e  United Kingdom and Canada have demonstrated t h a t  a  con- 
c e r t e d  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  t o  impose c o s t  c o n s t r a i n t  can- be e f f e c -  
t i v e  -- a t  l e a s t  f o r  a  while* -- i n  many na t ions  t h e  government 
s e c t o r  i s  simply n o t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  powerful t o  c o n t r o l  a l l  of 
t h e  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  must be c o n t r o l l e d  i n  a  s u c c e s s f u l  cost-  
containment campaign. Some observers ,  economists prominent 
among them, b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  lack  of power may be a l l  t o  t h e  good. 
* 
I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  how long t h e  B r i t i s h  Nat ional  Health Serv ice  
w i l l  cont inue t o  ope ra t e  wi th in  i t s  a u s t e r e  budgets ,  o r  how 
long Canada w i l l  be a b l e  t o  c o n s t r a i n  n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  expen- 
d i t u r e s  t o  l e s s  than 8 percent  of i t s  G N P .  
A hypothesis with wide currency among American health 
economists is that an appropriate degree of expenditure 
containment could be achieved simply by confronting the 
actors in these markets -- consumers, producers, and third- 
party payers -- with appropriate financial incentives to 
observe economy in the use of health resources. On this 
hypothesis it is believed that public policy need not be 
targeted directly on any of the variables in Figure 10 at 
all, but that public policy merely needs to create and main- 
tain a framework for the appropriate determination of targets 
B and~C. The sine qua non of such a framework is thought to 
be a system of price-competitive markets for health services 
and significant cost sharing on the part of patients. An 
integral part of the development of such a framework would 
be the establishment of truly competitive health insurance 
markets, an approach best exemplified in the Consumer-Choice 
Health Plan proposed by Alain Enthoven (1980) or the quite 
similar plan proposed independently by Walter McClure (1982). 
Figure 1 1  illustrates the set of economic pressures 
thought by economists to be essential to the efficient func- 
tioning of a price-competitive health care system. By forcing 
consumers to purchase health insurance out of after-tax income 
and by inducing each employer to offer employees an entire 
array of alternative health insurance packages (possibly 
including an HMO option) there would be pressure on competing 
insurance carriers to offer price-competitive insurance pack- 
ages. To be price-competitive in the insurance market, in- 
surors would naturally have to exert pressure on health care 
providers (1) not to over-prescribe health services and (2) to 
price these services reasonably., In exerting this pressure 
on providers, the insurance industry would be assisted by 
patients who would bear a substantial fraction of the cost 
of the health services they receive at the point of service. 
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Figure 1 1 .  The pressure system expected from the pro-competitive strategy. 
F i n a l l y ,  employers would be encouraged t o  e n t e r  d i r e c t l y  
w i t h  p r o v i d e r s  i n t o  arrangements whereby t h e  f i r m ' s  employees 
would o b t a i n  p r i c e  d i s c o u n t s  from a  l is t  of  " p r e f e r r e d  pro- 
v i d e r s "  ( i . e . ,  h e a l t h  c a r e  p r o v i d e r s  -- d o c t o r s  and h o s p i t a l s  
-- who have agreed  t o  t r e a t  t h e  f i r m ' s  employees a t  d i scounted  
p r i c e s ) .  These s o - c a l l e d  Pre fe r red-Prov ider -Organ iza t ions  
(PPOs)  have r e c e n t l y  appeared i n  s e v e r a l  c i t i e s  i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  and a r e  s p r e a d i n g  f a i r l y  r a p i d l y .  
I n  s h o r t ,  t h e n ,  t h e  compe t i t i ve  framework env isaged  by 
American h e a l t h  economists*  and,  i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  endorsed by 
t h e  c u r r e n t  Admin i s t r a t i on ,  c a l l s  f o r  economic p r e s s u r e  on 
p r o v i d e r s  by bo th  p a t i e n t s  d i r e c t l y  and,  i n d i r e c t l y ,  through 
a  compe t i t i ve  hea l t h - i n su rance  market .  The scheme can be  
viewed a s  an exaspe ra t ed  response  t o  t h e  pe rce ived  f a i l u r e  
t o  c o n s t r a i n  t h e  growth o f  h e a l t h  c a r e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  through 
o t h e r  r e g u l a t o r y  d e v i c e s  (dev i ce s  t h a t  a r e  o f t e n  a t  odds w i th  
t h e  wider  c o n t e x t  o f  a  market  economy). 
Hea l th  c a r e  p r o v i d e r s  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  -- and else- . 
where,  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r  -- t y p i c a l l y  p r o f e s s  concep tua l  suppo r t  
f o r  t h e  n o t i o n  of  a  compe t i t i ve  market  sys tem,  i f  o n l y  because  
t h a t  approach draws away f i r e  from t a r g e t s  c l o s e r  t o  home 
( e . g . ,  t a r g e t s  C 1  and C3). Unfo r tuna t e ly ,  t h e  p r o v i d e r s '  
enthusiasm f o r  t h e  model t ends  t o  wane once t h e  meaning o f  
"compet i t ion"  i s  exp la ined  t o  them more c o n c r e t e l y  w i t h i n  
t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e i r  own markets .  P h y s i c i a n s ,  f o r  example, 
g e n e r a l l y  show l i t t l e  en thus iasm f o r  compe t i t i on  from s e l f -  
employed paramedical  manpower, f o r  an  expanded supply  of  
medical  manpower, o r  f o r  p o l i c i e s  t o  inform consumers b e t t e r  
w i th  r e g a r d  t o  bo th  t h e  p r i c e  and t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  medical  
t r e a t m e n t s .  
* 
American h e a l t h  e c o n o m i s t s ' d o  n o t  form a  d i s t i n c t  s o c i a l  o r  
p o l i t i c a l  group. Not a l l  of  them endorse  t h e  scheme d e s c r i b e d  
above, b u t  many do. 
This skep t i c i sm toward t h e  market model seems t o  be shared  
by h e a l t h  c a r e  p r o v i d e r s  and by p o l i c y  makers i n  o t h e r  coun- 
t r i e s  a s  w e l l .  Canada, France,  and West Germany, f o r  example, 
do n o t  r e l y  a t  a l l  on t h e  no t ion  of compet i t ive  markets i n  
t h e i r  approach t o  c o s t  and expendi ture  containment .  Broadly 
speaking,  t h e  main t h r u s t  of t h e i r  p o l i c i e s  h a s  been t o  con- 
s t r a i n  expend i tu re s  on phys i c i an  s e r v i c e s  through n e g o t i a t e d  
o r  imposed f e e  schedules  and t o  c o n t r o l  expend i tu re s  on in -  
p a t i e n t  s e r v i c e s  through c o n t r o l l e d  p e r  diems o r  g l o b a l  bud- 
g e t s ,  on t h e  one hand, and c o n t r o l s  on p h y s i c a l  capac i ty  on 
t h e  o t h e r .  Table 5 p r e s e n t s  a  h igh ly  condensed summary of 
t h e  main c o s t - c o n t r o l  ins t ruments  used i n  t h e  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s .  
Nei ther  of t h e  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s  a s s i g n s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  
t o  p a t i e n t s  i n  t h e  c o s t - c o n t r o l  p rocess .  A s  a l r eady  no ted ,  
t h e r e  remains a  modest degree  of co insurance  i n  France (Table 
5), b u t  i t s  average impact has  dec l ined  over  t ime.  Canada 
and West Germany have adopted f i r s t - d o l l a r  coverage a s  a  
ma t t e r  of p r i n c i p l e .  Although phys i c i ans  i n  bo th  n a t i o n s  
have occas iona l ly  c a l l e d  f o r  c o s t  s h a r i n g  on t h e  p a r t  of 
p a t i e n t s * ,  n e i t h e r  consumers nor  t h e i r  l e g i s l a t i v e  represen-  
t a t i v e s  have s o  f a r  shown any i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  move i n  t h a t  
d i r e c t i o n .  
J u s t  why p a t i e n t s  and p o l i c y  makers i n  most o t h e r  n a t i o n s  
a r e  s o  r e l u c t a n t  t o  embrace t h e  n o t i o n  of c o s t  s h a r i n g  and p r i c e  
compet i t ion i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  i s  an i n t r i g u i n g  q u e s t i o n .  Some spe- 
c u l a t i o n  on t h i s  q u e s t i o n  w i l l  be o f f e r e d  i n  t h e  c l o s i n g  s e c t i o n  
of t h i s  e s say .  A s  s o  o f t e n  happens i n  s o c i a l  p o l i c y ,  t h e  i s s u e  
r evo lves  around a  t r ade -o f f  between e q u i t y  and economic e f f i c i e n c y .  
* 
Phys ic ians  t y p i c a . 1 1 ~  make t h e  ca se  f o r  c o s t  s h a r i n g  on t h e  argu- 
ments t h a t  it would e l i c i t  more r e s p o n s i b l e  conduct  on t h e  p a r t  
of  p a t i e n t s ,  f r e e  medical  p r a c t i c e  from t r i v i a l  c a s e s ,  and con- 
t r i b u t e  toward expend i tu re  containment.  There may be something 
t o  t h e  f i r s t  argument and p o s s i b l y  t o  t h e  second. One doubts ,  
however, t h a t  phys i c i ans  s e r i o u s l y  b e l i e v e  t h e  t h i r d .  Hea l th  c a r e  
p rov ide r s  do n o t  normally f avo r  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  reduce t h e  aggrega te  
flow of funds t o  p rov ide r s .  A more p l a u s i b l e  exp lana t ion  f o r  t h e  
phys i c i ans '  p o s t u r e  i s  t h a t  c o s t  s h a r i n g ,  coupled wi th  t h i r d - p a r t y  
coverage,  w i l l  draw more funds t o  t h e  h e a l t h  c a r e  s e c t o r  than  
could o therwise  be had from t h i r d - p a r t y  payers  under u n i v e r s a l  
f i r s t - d o l l a r  coverage.  
Table 5.  Dominant e lements  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  of h e a l t h  c a r e  
expendi tures  . 




l ay  f o r  phyqician 
se rv i ces  and p re sc r ip -  
2. U t i l i z a t i o n  
3. The capaci ty  of 
h o s p i t a l s  
4. P r i ce s  of h o s p i t a l  
i npu t s  
5. Cost a h r i n g  by 
p a t i e n t s  
t i o n  drugs  ex ante .  
Control is at tempted 
through nego t i a t ed  pe r  
diems t h a t  r e q u i r e  t h e  
approval of t h e  s t a t e  
govemwnt  which can. 
i n  p r inc ip l e .  set t he  
per d i m .  
No d i r e c t  con t ro l .  
Because c a p i t a l  expea- 
d i t u r e s  a r e  f inanced 
by a mixture  of s t a t e  
and f e d e r a l  funds. 
t he re  is  a u r h o r i t y  a t  
t he  s t a t e  l e v e l  t o  
l i m i t  capac i ty  through 
regional  planning. 




The i n d i v i d u a l  hospi- 
t a l ' s  reveaues a r e  pre- 
d e t e r m i a d  through bud- 
g e t s  t h a t  p r ~ t  be 
spproved by t h e  pro- 
' v i n c i a l  governmeac. 
No d i r e c t  control .  
Control led  through 
r eg iona l  p lanning by 
the  p r o v i n c i a l  govern- 
ments which f inance 
roughly NO-thirds of 
b u p i c a l  out lays .  
No d i r e c t  control .  
Noae. 
ON UOSPITAL CARE 
Control is a t t ~ t e d  
through negot ia ted per  
diema t h a t  r e q u i r e  
t he  approval of t h e  
Departement's PrCfet.  
No d i r e c t  coa r ro l .  
Control led  through 
regional  planning 
supervised by the  cen- 
t r a l  government. 
No d i r e c t  con t ro l .  
V i r tua l ly  none. 
4 .  THE DISTRIBUTIONAL ETHICS IMPOSED ON HEALTH CARE 
Throughout t h e  preceding remarks r epea t ed  r e f e r e n c e  was 
made t o  t h e  "consumers" and "producers"  of h e a l t h  c a r e  and t o  
t h e  "markets" i n  which they  t r a n s a c t .  This  nomenclature b e t r a y s  
a p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  of view, namely: t h a t  h e a l t h  c a r e  s e r v i c e s  
a r e  j u s t  one p a r t i c u l a r  type  of commodity whose produc t ion  and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  can be analyzed wi th  t h e  convent iona l  t o o l s  of 
n e o c l a s s i c a l  economic theo ry .  American h e a l t h  economists  t y p i -  
c a l l y  adopt  t h i s  view, a s  do many h e a l t h  p o l i c y  makers and, 
indeed,  many h e a l t h  c a r e  "producers" .  
C r i t i c s  of  t h i s  view argue t h a t  h e a l t h  c a r e  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  
i t s e l f  from o r d i n a r y  commodities i n  a number of ways no tab ly  
by ( 1  ) t h e  consumer's i n a b i l i t y  t o  judge t h e  t e c h n i c a l  q u a l i t y  
of  h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  and ( 2 )  t h e  widely shared  e t h i c a l  p recep t  
t h a t  h e a l t h  c a r e  ought n o t  t o  be r a t i o n e d  among members of 
s o c i e t y  through p r i c e s  and t h e  budget  c o n s t r a i n t s  of  i n d i v i -  
dua l  households.  Two obse rva t ions  can be made i n  connect ion 
wi th  t h e  l a t t e r  argument. F i r s t ,  most n a t i o n s  a r e  n o t  prepared 
t o  d i s t r i b u t e  o t h e r  commodities -- such a s  food,  c l o t h i n g ,  
t r a n s p o r a t i o n  and s h e l t e r  -- on a s t r i c t  ab i l i t y - to -pay  sys-  
tem. Health c a r e  i s  b u t  one of  ma.ny commodities whose d i s t r i -  
bu t ion  is  guided i n  whole o r  i n  p a r t  by c e r t a i n  e g a l i t a r i a n  
p r e c e p t s  shared  by members of  s o c i e t y .  But,  second,  t h e r e  
always rises t h e  ques t ion  i n  connect ion wi th  such commodities: 
j u s t  what degree  of  e g a l i t a r i a n i s m  needs t o  be a t t a i n e d  t o  
s a t i s f y  s o c i e t y ' s  e t h i c a l  norms? 
I n  connect ion wi th  h e a l t h  c a r e ,  f o r  example one can t h i n k  
of t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  s e t s  of  e t h i c a l  p recep t s  t h a t  may be imposed 
on t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of t h a t  commodity, namely: 
T h e  S o l i d a r i t y  P r i n c i p l e  - The t r ea tmen t  a person 
r e c e i v e s  f o r  a g iven cond i t i on  should be independent of  
t h a t  p e r s o n ' s  socioeconomic and p o l i t i c a l  s t a t u s ,  and 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  any h e a l t h  i n su rance  
pool should be based s t r i c t l y  on h i s / h e r  a b i l i t y  t o  pay 
and no t  on convent iona l  a c t u a r i a l  p r i n c i p l e s .  
The Basic-Needs P r i n c i p  Ze - Every m e m b e r  o f  s o c i e t y  
be g u a r an t eed  a c c e s s  t o  a  p o l i t i c a l l y  de te rmined  mini-  
mal ly  adequate se t  of  h e a l t h  c a r e  s e r v i c e s ,  b u t  n o t  a l l  
t e c h n i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e  h e a l t h  c a r e  s e r v i c e s  need b e  made 
a c c e s s i b l e  t o  a l l  members o f  s o c i e t y  who might  poten- 
t i a l l y  b e n e f i t  from such  s e r v i c e s ,  no r  need t h e  b a s i c  
s e r v i c e s  be  made a v a i l a b l e  on e q u a l  t e r m s  ( e . g . ,  w i t h  
t h e  p a t i e n t ' s  comple te ly  f r e e  c h o i c e  o f  t h e  p r o v i d e r ) .  
The Extreme Market P r i n c i p l e  - The e t h i c a l  p r e c e p t s  
u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  h e a l t h  c a r e  shou ld  b e  
t h e  same a s  t h o s e  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f ,  s a y ,  
f i n e  wines  o r  shoe  l a c e s .  
Few, i f  any,  commentators on h e a l t h  p o l i c y  e v e r  espouse  
t h e  Marie-Antoinet te ism i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  t h i r d  o f  t h e s e  p r i n c i -  
p l e s .  W e  can d i s m i s s  it a s  p r a c t i c a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t .  The c h o i c e  
between t h e  f i r s t  and t h e  second o f  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  however, 
is  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s e l f - e v i d e n t .  A f t e r  a l l ,  f o r  q u i t e  a  few 
i m p o r t a n t  commodities -- food and c l o t h i n g  among them -- most 
s o c i e t i e s  h a p p i l y  en d o r se  t h e  bas ic -needs  approach.  Must t h a t  
approach be r u l e d  o u t  a p r i o r i  i n  connec t i on  w i t h  h e a l t h  c a r e ?  
To r e f l e c t  upon t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  it may be  w e l l  t o  b r i n g  
t o  view y e t  o t h e r  o b j e c t i v e s  one would l i k e  t o  see a  n a t i o n a l  
h e a l t h  sys tem s a t i s f y :  
(i) I n  a  market  economy, a t  any r a t e ,  one would l i k e  
t o  o f f e r  t h e  p r o d u ce r s  o f  h e a l t h  c a r e  a s  much freedom 
a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  conduc t  t h e i r  p r a c t i c e  a s  t hey  see f i t  
and t o  p r i c e  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  a s  t h e y  see f i t .  
(ii) I n  any sys tem -- market  o r  c e n t r a l l y  p lanned -- 
one would l i k e  t h e  h e a l t h  c a r e  s e c t o r  t o  be  s u b j e c t  
t o  economic and budge t  c o n t r o l .  ("Economic c o n t r o l "  
means t h a t  c o s t s  i n c u r r e d  shou ld  be j u s t i f i a b l e  by 
b e n e f i t s  p e r ce i v ed .  "Budget c o n t r o l "  means t h a t  
a c t u a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  shou ld  s t a y  w i t h i n  budget  l e v e l s ) .  
Table 6  a r r a y s  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  an a n a l y t i c  g r i d ,  
along wi th  t h e  presumably widely shared  goa l  t h a t  t h e  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  of h e a l t h  c a r e  be a s  e g a l i t a r i a n  a s  can b e .  A 
hypothes i s  I would l i k e  t o  o f f e r  i s  t h a t  a  h e a l t h  c a r e  system 
can u s u a l l y  s a t i s f y  w e l l  only  two of t h e  t h r e e  desiderata 
shown i n  Table 6 ,  b u t  n o t  a l l  t h r e e .  
Heal th  c a r e  p rov ide r s  would probably always p r e f e r  systems 
f a l l i n g  i n t o  t h e  f i r s t  row i n  Table 6. These systems would 
o f f e r  them complete economic and p r o f e s s i o n a l  freedom, and 
y e t  a l low them t o  own up f u l l y  t o  t h e  d i c t a t e s  of t h e  Hippo- 
c r a t i c  oa th .  Unfor tuna te ly ,  systems of t h i s  s o r t  u s u a l l y  do 
n o t  permit  e i t h e r  economic o r  budget  c o n t r o l .  Under t h e s e  
systems one l i t e r a l l y  e n t r u s t s  t h e  key t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  t r e a -  
s u r y  t o  h e a l t h  c a r e  p rov ide r s .  The approach i s  n o t  p r a c t i c a l  
i n  t h e  long run.  
Most n a t i o n s  -- c e r t a i n l y  t hose  desc r ibed  i n  Table 5 -- 
appear t o  have op ted  f o r  systems f a l l i n g  i n t o  t h e  second row 
of Table 6. I n  t h e s e  systems,  t h e  p u b l i c  deba t e  on h e a l t h  
p o l i c y  tends  t o  be c o n s t r a i n e d  by t h e  S o l i d a r i t y  P r i n c i p l e .  
Budget c o n t r o l  i s  achieved i n  l a r g e  p a r t  by seve re  c o n s t r a i n t s  
upon t h e  economic and ( o c c a s i o n a l l y )  p r o f e s s i o n a l  freedom of  
h e a l t h  c a r e  p rov ide r s  who c o n s t a n t l y  cha fe  under t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s .  
Pr ice -compet i t ive  market systems ( t h e  t h i r d  row i n  Table 6)  
can o f f e r  h e a l t h  c a r e  p rov ide r s  a  high degree  of economic and 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  freedom. Cost  c o n t r o l  under a  system is  maintained 
through compet i t ive  h e a l t h  c a r e  and h e a l t h  insurance  marke ts ,  
on t h e  one hand, and p r i c e s  and t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  of i n d i v i d u a l  
household budge ts ,  on t h e  o t h e r .  I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  it might be 
p o s s i b l e  t o  p r e s e r v e  a  reasonable  degree  of e q u i t y  i n  such a  
system through a  c a r e f u l l y  c a l i b r a t e d  degree  of cos t - sha r ing  
i n  which t h e  p a t i e n t ' s  maximum p o t e n t i a l  annual  o u t l a y  on 
h e a l t h  c a r e  r i s e s  i n  s t e p  wi th  a b i l i t y  t o  pay. I n  p r a c t i c e ,  
however, even t h e  most c a r e f u l l y  cons t ruc t ed  pr ice-compet i t ive  
market system is  l i k e l y  t o  abandon t h e  S o l i d a r i t y  P r i n c i p l e  i n  
f a v o r  of t h e  Basic-Needs P r i n c i p l e .  Such systems may t h e r e f o r e  
be r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  two- t i e r  h e a l t h  c a r e  systems (a l though  t h e  
Table 6. Competing objectives in health care: basic prototypical systems that span the 
set of actual systems. 
Desiderata 
Freedom from government 
Egalitarian interference in pricing and Budgetary and 
distribution in the practice of medicine cost control Prototypical system 




a national health insur- w 
ance system with fee I 
schedules and other utili- 
zation review budgetary 
controls (e.g., Canada, 
West Germany) 
a price-competitive market 
system 
bottom tier need not at all imply health care of a shoddy 
quality) . 
In the Western market economies, the basic thrust of 
health policy during the present century has been to move the 
health system toward an ever more egalitarian distribution of 
health care (although different routes to that goal were taken 
by the individual nations). As long as the technical complexity 
of health care was relatively low, it was relatively easy for 
a nation to subject the distribution of health care to the 
Solidarity Principle. A guarantee of access to all "technically 
feasible, medically necessary health care" did not imply stag- 
gering outlays for the individual patient. The slogan that 
"human life" (really, "human life-years") was priceless was cheap 
talk, because owning up to the slogan literally was cheap. 
In recent years -- especially in the last decade -- the 
pace of technological advance in health care has been breath- 
taking. It is now technically feasible to prolong life, often 
at a reasonable level of the quality of life, although occasion- 
ally at staggering cost per life-year maintained. In the United 
States, sums in excess of $200,000 per year are now expended to 
prolong the life of individuals. The opportunities to perform 
such medical miracles will multiply in the next few decades. 
There will be a plethora of artificial organs -- including the 
artificial heart. Information about these breakthroughs will 
be rapidly diffused through the media and incorporated into 
patients' expectations. In that context, the dictum that "human 
life-years" are priceless takes on a new meaning, confronting 
policy makers and systems planners in all nations -- whatever 
the political system may be -- with troublesome economic and 
ethical questions. 
In the Western economies, policy makers and systems planners 
have so far sought to evade these ethical questions through the 
massive application of resources. With the possible exception 
of Great Britain, most nations have literally smothered the 
issue with funds. Policy analysts in these countries still 
dream of a world in which both equity and economy can be assured 
through clever tinkering with the system -- be it tinkering 
with financial incentives (the preferred approach in the United 
States) or tinkering with systems modeling and outright health 
sector planning. These efforts are likely to remain vacuous 
exercises, however, unless they proceed within a consensus 
on the distributional ethics to be imposed on health care. 
Systems planners and policy makers must begin there, rather 
than leaving the matter as an afterthought or just wishing it 
away altogether. 
In the Western market economies, for example, the issue 
boils down to a trade-off between the attained degree of egal- 
itarianism, on the one hand, and the attained degree of freedom 
for health care providers, on the other. Strict observance of 
egalitarianism may sooner or later force policy makers to out- 
law a technically feasible but prohibitively expensive medical 
procedure. The reason will be that a few politically and/or 
economically privileged individuals ought not to have health 
care that cannot be given to all individuals who could benefit 
from such care. Although such a policy might have great poli- 
tical appeal at any point in time, ironically, it would also be 
apt to stifle experimentation and innovation in health care. 
After all, there is a steep learning curve in medical technology. 
Through repeated application a technology that is expensive at 
one point in time may become relatively affordable at a later 
point in time. 
On the other hand, if a nation seeks to encourage innovation 
and experimentation by granting health care providers a wide 
degree of professional and economic freedom, then there is 
likely to emerge a multi-tier health care system at any point 
in time. As is well known, in virtually all societies (whatever 
their political philosophy may be) those individuals who are 
blessed with high economic and/or political status will tend 
to do better within a multi-tier health care system than do 
the less well connected. Such an outcome may offend one's 
ethical precepts, at least in principle. 
Scientists, systems analysts, and policy analysts typically 
find it uncomfortable to grapple with these issues. These 
issues are, after all, so indeterminate. My sense, and my 
point at this Conference, is that we shall ignore these issues 
at the risk of becoming irrelevant to the process of health 
policy making. 
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SOME GENERAL STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS 
I N  SOCIAL SECURITY 
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1 .  INTRODUCTION 
I n  t h e  l a s t  f i v e  yea r s  people have become more and more 
concerned wi th  t h e  r o l e  t h a t  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  p l ay ing  i n  t h e i r  
pe r sona l  l i v e s  and i n  t h e  economy a t  l a r g e .  Although a  major 
p ropor t ion  of t h e  GNP i n  many developed c o u n t r i e s  i s  now s p e n t  
on s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  i t s  c o s t s  a r e  r i s i n g  i n  an u n c o n t r o l l a b l e  
way. Our o b j e c t i v e  i n  t h i s  paper i s  n o t  t o  judge t h i s  observed 
growth i n  terms of  "bad" o r  "good", s i n c e  our  op in ion  would n o t  
c a r r y  any more weight  t han  t h a t  of any o t h e r  c i t i z e n .  Ra ther ,  
w e  would l i k e  t o  c l a r i f y  what s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  and more spec i -  
f i c a l l y  what i ts  r o l e  i s  i n  our  economies. 
S ince  t h e  beginning of man t h e r e  has  been s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  
a l though  it has  f r e q u e n t l y  been c a l l e d  c h a r i t y :  a  p r i v a t e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of c h i l d r e n  t o  t h e i r  p a r e n t s ,  o r  t h e  Church t o  
t h e  s i c k  and e l d e r l y .  
I n  o u r  developed s o c i e t i e s  today t h i s  t a s k  has  been t r a n s -  
f e r r e d  t o  t h e  s t a t e .  I n  s e v e r a l  r e s p e c t s  t h e r e  has  been a  tre- 
mendous evo lu t ion .  
( a )  Contrary  t o  c h a r i t y ,  people  a r e  now e n t i t l e d  by l aw  
t o  r e c e i v e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e n e f i t s  i f  t hey  s a t i s f y  
e l i g i b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s .  
( b )  S o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e n e f i t s  a r e  no longer  f inanced  by 
vo lun ta ry  g i f t s  and l e g a c i e s ,  b u t  by (most ly)  ob l iga -  
t o r y  payments by c i t i z e n s  o u t  of t h e i r  ea rned  income. 
( c )  The connec t ion  between those  who pay and t h o s e  who 
b e n e f i t  h a s  been loosened by t h e  emergence of  i n t e r -  
mediate  agenc ie s ,  or  " t h i r d  p a r t i e s " .  
W e  w i l l  n o t  concern o u r s e l v e s  h e r e  w i th  t h e  d e t a i l s  i n  
va r ious  c o u n t r i e s .  Obviously r e g u l a t i o n s  vary a  g r e a t  d e a l  
between developed c o u n t r i e s  a l l  over  t h e  world ,  and it would 
b e  imposs ib le  and s e n s e l e s s  t o  enumerate a l l  t h o s e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
d e t a i l s .  The o b j e c t i v e  of t h i s  paper  i s  an a n a l y s i s  of t h e  
common s t r u c t u r e  of s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  arrangements.  W e  begin 
wi th  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of e l i g i b l i t y  and t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of b e n e f i t s .  
W e  then  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  funding system and d e a l  w i th  t h e  impact 
o f  a  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  system on t h e  economy a s  a  whole. I n  t h e  
second h a l f  of t h e  paper  w e  cons ide r  some s p e c i a l  problems, 
which f r e q u e n t l y  a r i s e  and i n t e r f e r e  w i th  t h e  working of t h e  
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  system and conclude with  some thoughts  f o r  
f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h .  
ELIGIBLITY 
I n  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  m a t t e r s  t h e  world i s  always d iv ided  i n t o  
t h r e e ,  n o t  always e x c l u s i v e ,  groups.  They a r e  
( a )  t h e  group of  t hose  who r e c e i v e  b e n e f i t s  ( b e n e f i c i a r i e s )  
( b )  t hose  who pay t h e  b e n e f i t s  
( c )  o t h e r s  
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w e  cons ide r  t h e  f i r s t  of t hose  groups.  In  
o r d e r  t o  q u a l i f y  f o r  a  r e t i r e m e n t  pension one has  t o  be  ove r  a  
c e r t a i n  age ( e . g . ,  65), whi le  an a d d i t i o n a l  c r i t e r i o n  may be  
a c t u a l  r e t i r emen t  from a  job. I n  o rde r  t o  q u a l i f y  f o r  unem- 
ployment b e n e f i t s  one should be unemployed, i n  o rde r  t o  o b t a i n  
d i s a b i l i t y  b e n e f i t s  one should be d i s a b l e d ,  e t c .  I n  s h o r t  each 
arrangement A has i t s  own c r i t e r i o n .  The i n d i v i d u a l  i i s  
descr ibed  by a  number of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  say 
and i f  t hose  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  s a t i s f y  s p e c i f i c  cond i t ions ,  say 
C ~ f  i n d i v i d u a l  i q u a l i f i e s  f o r  b e n e f i t s .  I t  may very w e l l  be 
t h a t  i q u a l i f i e s  f o r  two arrangements A and B s imultaneously.  
Then he may o r  may n o t  r ece ive  b e n e f i t s  from both arrangements. 
A t  f i r s t  s i g h t  t h i s  looks l i k e  a  r a t h e r  simple system, 
u n t i l  w e  r e a l i z e  t h a t  some c r i t e r i a  a r e  n o t  s o  e a s i l y  t e s t a b l e .  
For in s t ance ,  t h e  t e s t i n g  of such v a r i a b l e s  a s  i l l n e s s  and d i s -  
a b i l i t y  t o  work, o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t o  f i n d  a  job f o r  someone 
p resen t ly  unemployed may be d i f f i c u l t  and c o s t l y  i n  p r a c t i c e .  
I n  s h o r t  t h e r e  i s  a  b u i l t - i n  inaccuracy,  which can be improved 
only i f  w e  a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  screening-cost .  But t h e  
problem becomes more d i f f i c u l t  when w e  r e a l i z e  t h a t  people may 
have an i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  outcome of t h e  tes t  and may be a b l e  t o  
in f luence  t h e  screening .  This  impl ies  t h a t  we a r e  c e r t a i n  t h a t  
a t  l e a s t  some of those  who a r e  q u a l i f i e d  a f t e r  sc reening  a r e  
i n c o r r e c t l y  dec la red  q u a l i f i e d .  You might c a l l  it an e r r o r  of 
Type 1 i n  s t a t i s t i c a l  terminology. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, some 
people w i l l  be d i s q u a l i f i e d  f o r  b e n e f i t s ,  an e r r o r  of Type 2 .  
Obviously, t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  a r e  t r y i n g  t o  minimize both types  
of e r r o r s ,  al though t h e r e  i s  f r equen t ly  a  d i f f e r e n t  eva lua t ion  
of t h e  two e r r o r s .  Because t h e  person t o  be screened i s  f r e -  
quent ly  a  p l aye r  i n  t h e  game, w e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  many screening  
e r r o r s  w i l l  be made. 
The most pe rn ic ious  problem i s  t h a t  most of t h e  v a r i a b l e s  
cannot be seen a s  o b j e c t i v e  v a r i a b l e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  they  cannot be 
measured without  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  of t h e  person involved.  They 
a r e  d e f i n i t e l y  s u b j e c t i v e ,  which impl ies  t h a t  some i n d i v i d u a l  
responses in theory as well as in practice cannot be verified 
from other sources. In mathematical-statistical terms we look 
for the true variable St where we observe 
in which E represents random errors of measurement, and T the 
explicit influence of the person who is subject to screening. 
The number of people of the type x is denoted by n(x). 
3. STRUCTURE OF THE BENEFITS 
Since the benefit structure varies from country to country, 
it is difficult to give a general picture of the structures of 
all benefits in all countries. In general, the benefit b is a 
function of three types of variables 
(a) e l i g i b i l i t y  variables x, e.g., the degree of disability, 
the number of children 
(b) i n t e r v e n i n g  variables y, like previous income, income 
from other sources, previous premium payment, the dura- 
tion of employment before becoming jobless 
(c) a t i m e  variable t, starting either at the beginning 
of eligibility or before. For example, many benefits, 
say unemployment benefits,are only given for a specific 
time period such as a half year 
We may denote the benefit corresponding to an arrangement 
A as bA(x,y,t). The nature of the benefits may be of a monetary 
nature or payment in kind. Examples of the former are: 
( 1 ) unemployment benefits 
(2) old-age pensions 
(3) family allowances 
Examples of the latter are: 
(1) food stamps 
(2) medical services (e.g., in a National Health Service) 
(3) subsidized housing 
These benefits can be evaluated in terms of money, and in the 
following pages this will be done implicitly. With respect to 
the shape of the benefit function bA, we can say that 
(a) The size of benefits is positively related with the 
eligibility variables x. The more extensive the care, 
the higher the benefits. Frequently x is measured 
in terms of a ratio between 0 and 1, e.g., unemploy- 
ment and degree of disability. In that case b is 
frequently proportional to x, say b(xtyttt) = xb(y,t) . 
(b) The relation with past income may differ considerably. 
If the benefit is intended to r e p l a c e  earned income, 
we expect to find a profile as shown in Figure 1. 
Benefit 
L I I I 
Ymin 'max Past  y income 
Figure 1. The profile of an income-replacing benefit. 
The benefit is frequently related to past earnings, 
with a lower boundary set equal to the accepted subsis- 
tence level in society. Also there is an upper bound- 
ary. If the benefit is complementary to existing income, 
for example in the case of social assistance, housing 
subsidies, or medical assistance, the profile is fre- 
quently just the opposite. People with low incomes 
receive more in order to sustain a specific welfare 
level in relation to high-income people. 
(c) The dependency on time is in general nonincreasing. 
The profile may be any one of the three sketched in 
Figure 2. The limited time periods are generally used 
when it is assumed that the beneficiary is sensitive 
to incentives to look for work. The unlimited time 
period is typical for those programs where the indivi- 
dual cannot exert any influence on his own condition, 
for example sickness, disability, or aging. 
Note that some benefit structures are not legally fixed but 
are flexible in the sense that a civil servant or an authority 
has to apply some vague rule to the claim. In these cases there 
is a personal discretionary element involved, which is frequently 
found in the long-term social assistance assigned to people who 
did not participate in the labor force. 
In general we are now able to denote the burden BA of social 
arrangement A by multiplying the benefits in the various classes 
with the numbers in those classes. We have 
where summation takes place with respect to the severity of the 
case, measured by x, with intervening variables y, and time to 
being when people began their qualification according to arrange- 
ment A. In the same way the whole burden of benefit payments 
denoted by B(t) is found by summing over all social programs 
I 
T ime 
Constant over limited period 
I 
T ime 
Constant over unlimited period 
Decreasing over time 
Figure 2. Benefit profiles over time. 
B t  t . . . t B K ( t ) .  I n  o r d e r  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  sys tem w e  compare t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  burden t o  GNP 
denoted by Y ,  and w e  d e f i n e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  burden 
by B = B/Y. 
4 .  THE FUNDING SYSTEM 
J u s t  a s  t h e r e  i s  a  v a r i e t y  o f  ar rangements  and b e n e f i t  
s t r u c t u r e s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  whole spect rum of  fund ing  sys tems.  The 
two dimensions of any fund ing  sys tem a r e :  
( 1 )  i t s  d ive rgence  from t h e  equ iva l ence  p r i n c i p l e  
( 2 )  i t s  d ive rgence  from t h e  pay-as-you-go-system 
Equivalence  
The c l a s s i c a l  sys tem of  hedging f o r  c a l a m i t i e s  is  c l e a r l y  
t h e  p r i v a t e  i n s u r a n c e  model a s  used ,  e . g . ,  f o r  f i r e  i n s u r a n c e  
o r  c a r  a c c i d e n t s .  The v a l u e  o f  t h e  expec ted  monetary r i s k  is  
a c t u a r i a l l y  e v a l u a t e d  and someone may buy t h e  i n s u r a n c e  f o r  t h a t  
p r i c e .  I f  t h i s  e q u a l i t y  h o l d s  t h e r e  i s  e q u i v a l e n c e  between t h e  
p r i c e  o f  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  and t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e  r ende red .  
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t o  be  i n s u r e d  i s  advantageous  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
a s  h e  i s  unab le  t o  pay f o r  t h e  c a l a m i t y ,  i f  it o c c u r s ,  from h i s  
own income, w h i l e  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  company, t hanks  t o  t h e  Law of 
Large  Numbers, can .  S i n c e  a l l  r i s k s  d i f f e r ,  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  t h i s  
c a l l s  f o r  an  i n s u r a n c e  premium t h a t  i s  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  per i n d i -  
v i d u a l .  P r a c t i c a l l y  it would c o s t  a  g r e a t  deal t o  make such a  
d e t a i l e d  r i s k  assessment ;  hence t a i lo r -made  i n s u r a n c e  i s  r a r e  
and uni form packages a r e  t h e  r u l e .  
Even p r i v a t e  i n s u r a n c e  does  n o t  whol ly  conform t o  t h e  
e q u i v a l ence  p r i n c i p l e .  Some p o l i c y  buyers  t e n d  t o  g e t  more f o r  
t h e i r  money t h a n  o t h e r s .  There  i s  a  h idden  t r a n s f e r  where low 
r i s k s  pay t h e  coverage  f o r  t h e  h i g h  r i s k s .  I n  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y  
i n s u r e r s  canno t  d e v i a t e  t o o  f a r  from t h e  equ iva l ence  p r i n c i p l e ,  
because  t h e n  a  compe t i t o r  would o f f e r  t h e  same i n s u r a n c e  b u t  
f o r  less money t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  low r i s k s .  The low r i s k s  would 
"crowd-out" from t h e  c l i e n t e l e  of  t h e  f i r s t  company l e a v i n g  them 
w i t h  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  premium f o r  t h e  
h i g h - r i s k  s t a y e r s .  However, a s  t h e  s t a y e r s  are a l s o  v a r y i n g  
i n  r i s k  t h e  same p r o c e s s  would c o n t i n u e ,  u n t i l  a l l  c l i e n t s  have  
l e f t  t h e  non-risk-differentiating company. 
Any d i v e r g en ce  from t h e  equ iva l ence  p r i n c i p l e  might  be 
c a l l e d  a  s o l i d a r i t y  e lement .  From t h e  above a n a l y s i s  it i s  e v i -  
d e n t  t h a t  d i v e r g en ce  i s  p e n a l i z e d  i n  a  f r e e  market  s i t u a t i o n  
and is  co n seq u en t l y  u n s u s t a i n a b l e .  Any s o l i d a r i t y  e lement  t h a t  
remains  i s  s imply  due t o  t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  good d e t a i l e d  
r i s k - a s s e s sm en t .  It  f o l l o w s  t h a t  any s o l i d a r i t y  i n  an  i n s u r a n c e  
ar rangement  can  o n l y  be  s u s t a i n e d  i f  peop l e  are n o t  f r e e  ( o r  
would be  h i g h l y  p e n a l i z e d ) ,  t o  l e a v e  t h e  group o f  i n s u r e d  a f t e r  
hav ing  e n t e r e d  it. Th i s  i s  c e r t a i n l y  t h e  c a s e  o f  h e a l t h  i n s u r a n c e  
where younger f a m i l i e s  t e n d  t o  be low r i s k s  and s u b s i d i z e  t h e  
o l d e r  f a m i l i e s  i n  t h e  same i n su r ance .  H e r e ,  s o l i d a r i t y  r e s u l t s  
from t h e  f a i r l y  low age  b a r r i e r ,  excep t  i f  t h e  cus tomer  i s  w i l -  
l i n g  t o  pay a  h i g h e r  premium. However, o n l y  i n s u r a n c e  can  have 
a  s o l i d a r i t y  e lement .  I f  t h e  subgroup i nvo lved  i s  o b l i g e d  t o  
pay a  premium, w e  t h e n  speak no l o n g e r  o f  i n s u r a n c e  b u t  of  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y .  
W e  s a y  t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  a r rangement  i s  a pay-as-you-go-system 
i f  t h e  burden i n  y e a r  t ,  s a y  B i s  covered by t h e  premium t f  
revenue of t h a t  y e a r ,  s a y  P t' (The premium may be  p a i d  e i t h e r  
by t h e  p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i c i a r y  o r  by h i s  employer,  however, t h i s  
d e t a i l  i s  n o t  co n s i d e r ed  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n . )  
The pay-as-you-go s o l u t i o n  seems a c c e p t a b l e  i f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
s o c i a l  b u r d e n  Bt/Yt i s  s t a b l e  from y e a r  t o  y e a r .  
T h i s  i s  t h e  case e i t h e r  when t h e  a b s o l u t e  burden and 
n a t i o n a l  income a r e  s t a b l e  o v e r  t i m e  o r  i f  b o t h  change a t  t h e  
same r a t e ,  when t h e r e  i s  an  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  o f  a p e r c e n t  and i f  
t h e  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  a r e  f o r  100 p e r c e n t  c o r r e c t e d  f o r  i n f l a t i o n ,  
numerator  and denominator  i n c r e a s e d  by a f a c t o r  (1  + a) p e r  y e a r .  
The same h o l d s  i f  t h e r e  is  no i n f l a t i o n  b u t  a n  income 
i n c r e a s e  because  o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n c r e a s e ,  i n  which c a s e  s o c i a l  
b e n e f i t s  a r e  a l lowed  t o  p r o f i t  from p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n c r e a s e ,  pro-  
v i d e d  t h a t  t h e y  would n o t  have  changed o t h e r w i s e .  T h i s  i s  f r e -  
q u e n t l y  a n  u n r e a l i s t i c  assumpt ion .  I f  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n c r e a s e  i s  
caused  by t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  of  l a b o r  by c a p i t a l ,  it i m p l i e s  a n  
i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  unemployment r a t e  and t h u s  an  i n c r e a s e  o f  Bt a t  
f i x e d  t a r i f f s ,  even w i t h o u t  any p r o d u c t i v i t y  l i n k a g e  of  unemploy- 
ment b e n e f i t s .  
I f ,  however, o u r  aim i s  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  premium burden 
Pt ,  t h e  pay-as-you-go-system may b r i n g  us  i n t o  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
A s p e c i f i c  and v e r y  p a i n f u l  example i s  t h e  one  posed by t h e  
a g i n g  probZem. The r e l a t i v e  burden c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  an  o ld-age  
p e n s i o n  p l a n  B/Y depends on  t h e  r a t i o  of  p e o p l e  o v e r  6 5  y e a r s  
t o  p e o p l e  below t h a t  age .  
I f  t h a t  r a t i o  t e n d s  t o  i n c r e a s e  due t o  a f a l l  i n  t h e  b i r t h  
r a t e ,  it i m p l i e s  an  i n c r e a s e  o f  B/Y.  T h i s  i n c r e a s e  is  n o t  a l o n g  
a s t r a i g h t  l i n e  b u t  r a t h e r  a l o n g  a c u r v e  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  demo- 
g r a p h i c  e c h o - e f f e c t .  Obvious ly ,  i f  B/Y t e n d s  t o  a new and h i g h e r  
s t a t i o n a r y  v a l u e ,  t h e n  t h i s  w i l l  b e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  a h i g h e r  premium 
burden P/Y. I t  is  e v i d e n t  t h a t  by l e v y i n g  a somewhat h i g h e r  
premium t h a n  n e c e s s a r y  i n  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r s ,  t h e  sys tem may b u i l d  
up some c a p i t a l ,  t h e r e b y  e a s i n g  t h e  way up t h e  h i l l .  G e n e r a l l y ,  
p r e d i c t a b l e  e v o l u t i o n s  and f l u c t u a t i o n s  ( i n  employment) s h o u l d  
n o t  b e  d e a l t  w i t h  by a comple te  pay-as-you-go-system, b u t  t h e  
b e h a v i o r  o f  B/Y s h o u l d  be  f l a t t e n e d  by t h e  amount o f  i n v e s t m e n t s  
made from a premium, which i s  a s  s t a b l e  a s  p o s s i b l e .  T h i s  raises 
t h e  q u e s t i o n  whe the r  a pay-as-you-go-system i s  a v e r y  good sys tem 
f o r  a l l  a r rangements .  I t  does  n o t  s e e m  t o  be  s o  i f  w e  f a c e  heavy 
f l u c t u a t i o n s  o r  changes  i n  t h e  premium, because  t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  
e l ement  may become burdensome. T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c l e a r  when 
l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  a g i n g  problem. I f  t h e  younger g e n e r a t i o n  i n  1960 
p a i d  a r e a s o n a b l e  amount o f  p a y - r o l l  t a x  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  e l d e r l y ,  
they would like to have the same support when they are old in 
1995. In such cases it might be preferred to have a capital 
formation system where a personal title is built up, although 
certainly no solidarity is built in. Also mixtures of the two 
systems can be envisaged. However, the two main advantages of 
the capital-formation system are two other factors: 
(a) the accruing interests accelerate the built-up of 
capital and so the premium is lower than under the 
pay-as-you-go-system 
(b) the capital has to be invested and this implies a 
source of capital supply, so badly needed nowadays 
Coverage from Government Revenue 
The extreme of a pay-as-you-go-system, but not different 
in essence, is the system where social security benefits are 
paid straight from the tax revenue. If it is difficult to 
assess the benefit burden and if it is supposed that the burden 
will be small anyway, we frequently find that no separate social 
security premium is levied but that the social security benefit 
is simply paid as a part of governmental expenditures. In 
general, the cost-awareness for those programs is minimal as 
nobody thinks he has to pay a premium. In reality each citizen 
pays his share via taxes. Although it is not precisely clear 
who pays what part, it is quite evident that for an additional 
arrangement the burden will be shared by tax-payers according to 
their marginal tax rate. If taxes are not raised as the social 
benefit burden grows, an increased burden requires either a cut 
in other government spending or a budget deficit. One of the 
reasons for deficits in so many countries is the arrangement 
sketched above. Government cannot drop its responsibilities 
simply because its payments for social benefits are increasing 
so rapidly. Clearly in this respect a pay-as-you-go-system 
where a rising benefit burden is straightforwardly turned over 
to the premium payer is preferable from a cost-containment 
viewpoint. 
5 .  FITTING I N  SOCIAL SECURITY I N  THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
One of t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  misconcept ions ,  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  
r e c e n t l y ,  i s  t h a t  a  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  system has  no i n f l u e n c e  on 
t h e  behavior  of o t h e r  economic v a r i a b l e s  such a s  p r i c e  l e v e l ,  
unemployment r a t e ,  G N P ,  o r  c a p i t a l  investment .  The i d e a  t h a t  
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  j u s t  a  t r a n s f e r  of money from premium payers  
t o  b e n e f i t  r e c e i v e r s  wi th  no a d d i t i o n a l  consequences has t o  be  
r e j e c t e d .  L e t  us s t a r t  wi th  a c l o s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  t h e  pay- 
as-you-go-system. 
I n  t h e  c a s e  of non-voluntary enro l lment ,  it may be s a f e l y  
assumed t h a t  people  who have t o  pay a premium change t h e i r  
behavior .  The s u b j e c t s  who a r e  mainly involved are t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
bene f i c i a ry  and i n  many i n s t a n c e s  h i s  employer. 
The d i f f i c u l t y  w i th  most s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  premiums i s  t h a t  
t h e  worker i s  a c t u a l l y  made t o  buy something ( a  k ind  of i n s u r -  
ance) a t  a  p r e s c r i b e d  p r i c e .  Everybody i s  annoyed when he  has 
t o  buy something. When a person cannot  choose t h e  b e s t  ba rga in  
o r  make t h e  cho ice  t o  buy no th ing ,  he becomes f r u s t r a t e d .  This  
i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  i f  h e  unde r r a t e s  t h e  commodity a s  people  
tend  t o  do i n  t h e  c a s e  of s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  s i n c e  they  a r e  u s u a l l y  
ove r ly  o p t i m i s t i c  t h a t  ca lami ty  w i l l  n o t  s t r i k e  them o r  t h a t  
t h e  t i m e  of r e t i r e m e n t  i s  s t i l l  f a r  o f f .  
I n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  i n c l i n e d  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on 
t h e i r , n e t  d i s p o s a b l e  income a s  t h e i r  measure of m a t e r i a l  w e l l -  
being ,  f o r g e t t i n g  a lmost  completely about t h e  va lue  of t h e  
money t h a t  i s  withhe ld  f o r  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y .  I t  fo l lows  then  
t h a t  any i n c r e a s e  of s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  premiums seems l i k e l y  t o  
reduce t h e  mot iva t ion  t o  work. This  tendency i s  r e i n f o r c e d  
t h e  h ighe r  t h e  unemployment, s i c k n e s s ,  and d i s a b i l i t y  b e n e f i t s  
a r e  and/or t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  h e a l t h  c o s t  coverage i s .  Obviously 
t h i s  view w i l l  n o t  e a r n  a l o t  of applause  from t h o s e  people  who 
have an i d e a l i s t i c  image of mankind; however, r e a l i t y  g i v e s  
ample and d e p l o r a b l e  evidence t o  t h e  con t r a ry .  
The employer i s  n o t  happy wi th  t h e  burden of s o c i a l  premiums, 
mostly p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  wage sum he has  t o  pay. Basing h i s  
h i r e - a n d - f i r e -po l i cy  on a  comparison o f  ma rg ina l  r evenue  p e r  
d o l l a r  o f  l a b o r  c o s t ,  it i s  obvious  t h a t  an  i n c r e a s e  o f  l a b o r  
c o s t ,  caused  by a  r i s i n g  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e n e f i t ,  makes t h e  
h i r i n g  o f  workers  less p r o f i t a b l e .  For t h e  worker who j u s t  
e a r n s  h i s  wage, a s  c l a s s i c a l  t h e o r y  p r e s c r i b e s ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  
l a b o r  c o s t  w i l l  c a u s e  t h e  l a y o f f  o f  t h i s  marg ina l  worker ,  e i t h e r  
by f i r i n g  o r ,  i f  law f o r b i d s  t h a t ,  a  l a y o f f  under t h e  l e g i t i m i z i n g  
c o v e r  o f  d i s a b i l i t y .  A s  c a p i t a l  i n p u t s  a r e  n o t  t a x e d  by s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  premiums, it i s  imp l i ed  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  o f  l a b o r  
is r i s i n g  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  c a p i t a l  c aus ing  a  s u b s t i t u t i o n  of  l a b o r  
by c a p i t a l .  Moreover, an  a d d i t i o n a l  demand f o r  c a p i t a l  and an  
upwards t h r u s t  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i s  a l s o  imp l i ed .  Th i s  add i -  
t i o n a l  i n p u t  o f  c a p i t a l  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  m i t i -  
g a t i n g  t h e  l a y o f f  e f f e c t  a s  o u t l i n e d  above. 
A s  workers  a r e  pushed o u t  o f  t h e  work f o r c e ,  b o t h  by t h e i r  
employer and/or  by t h e i r  own w i l l ,  a r e d u c t i o n  o f  GNP o r  i t s  
monetary e q u i v a l e n t ,  n a t i o n a l  income w i l l  r e s u l t .  
I f  w e  l i k e  t o  keep consumption unchanged, c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  
well-known Keynesian i d e n t i t y  Y = C + I + ( E  - M) + G ,  one o r  
more o f  t h e  fo l l owing  e f f e c t s  a r e  impl ied :  
( 1 )  a  r e d u c t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  inves tment  
( 2 )  a  b a l a n c e  o f  payments d e f i c i t  
( 3 )  a  c u t  i n  government spending 
( 4 )  a n  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  d e b t  
( 5 )  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  money supp ly  w i t h  t h e  well-known 
i n f l a t i o n a r y  e f f e c t  
A l l  o f  t h e s e  problems a r e  c u r r e n t l y  found i n  p r e s e n t  s o c i e t i e s .  
Obviously s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  a  t r e a s u r e d  good, b u t  it h a s  some 
d i s a d v a n t ages  a s  w e l l .  
Coverage o u t  o f  Taxes 
The p r e v i o u s l y  d e s c r i b e d  e f f e c t s  o f  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  ho ld  
mos t ly  f o r  government f i nanced  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  sys tems ,  which 
have the advan tage  o f  t h e  t a x  burden n o t  be ing  obse rvab ly  
discriminating against the labor input of the firm. Its dis- 
advantage is that cost-awareness is more difficult to maintain. 
The easy solution is a government deficit with the resulting 
inflation and/or interest burden on the government debt. 
The Capital-Formation System 
The capital-formation system to finance social security is 
cert?inly the oldest system. Some of its definite advantages 
are that the premium revenue changes from consumer expenditures 
to savings, implying that there is an additional source of 
investment capital, although part of it is offset by the amount 
that would be saved in any event. The interest-mechanism makes 
the build-up of capital easier. Another feature that may be 
concurrent with the system but not necessarily so, is that each 
potential beneficiary receives a personal entitlement on the 
capital saved for him. In practice there are many problems 
caused by job mobility resulting in a switch from one pension 
fund to another. Obviously when personal property has been 
accumulated, divergence from the equivalence principle seems 
impossible. The adverse changes in the factor prices of labor 
and capital inputs and the resultant demotivation of workers 
and employers by the payment of SSP remains. Because risks are 
to a certain extent influenced by the insured himself, it is 
somewhat difficult to fix the premium on actuarial arguments 
alone with the exception of old-age pension insurance. 
6. THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
The major problem of present social security systems seems 
to be their immanent dynamic instability. This dynamic property 
seems to be first signalled in Van Praag and Halberstadt ( 1 9 7 8 )  
and later on elaborated in Van Praag and Emanuel ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  Given 
the fact that wages of workers are never proportional to their 
marginal productivity, as neoclassical economic theory postulates, 
for any wage structure there will be workers that are unattac- 
tive to hire, as they do not earn the marginal costs as a result 
of their employment. They are called non-employable at the 
given wage rate. So, even in a state with no social security, 
there would be unemployment. After introduction of a social 
security arrangement to pay benefits to the people who are non- 
employable, either as a result of a labor disability or illness 
or unemployment, it follows that the benefit burden has to be 
paid. Under a pay-as-you-go-system it will be financed to 
varying proportions by the employers and the employee. The 
impact on the employer is that it increases wage costs. The 
result is a partial layoff of labor increasing the number of 
non-employables and an increase in the premium burden to the 
employer in the nesting period. A second layoff follows, and 
SO on. 
A similar impact will be exerted on the workers. The 
increase of their payroll tax will act as a disincentive to 
participation in the work force, especially if the gap between 
benefit and net wage is not so large. It follows that also the 
worker's reaction will yield an increased unemployment in th6 
next period, resulting in a higher worker's premium level. 
As a result the system sets a dynamic process in motion, 
which may or may not converge to an equilibrium. Numerical 
simulations with a simple quantitative model show that the 
nature of the outcome is rather sensitive with respect to the 
specific parameter values used. It appears that the possibility 
of no equilibrium existing at all in the sense that the active 
employed population shrinks to zero, cannot be excluded. 
Obviously, in reality such an undesirable evolution will not 
last long as this emergency will be countered by emergency 
political measures. Those measures will then certainly include 
a reform of the social security system, which may entail a 
reduction in benefits. 
It may be thought that this phenomenon is only present 
when social security programs are structured on a pay-as-you- 
go basis. However, the same phenomenon is possible in a system 
where social security benefits are financed from general revenues 
collected from various tax sources. Also, when social security 
benefits are financed from general revenue, there will be non- 
employable people given the wage structure, and the resulting 
benefit burden implies an increasing tax burden. This addi- 
tional tax may be levied as a corporate tax, income tax, excise 
tax, or any other tax combination. The general result will be 
that industrial activity will be demotivated. However, in par- 
ticular sectors such as the production of inferior goods sector 
(or Giffin-goods), activity may be increased. It follows that 
the demotivation of industrial activity will lead to a new lay- 
off of labor (and capital), implying an increase in the social 
burden. This necessitates a new tax increase, and so on. 
Short-term solutions are feasible. The first idea is of 
course to finance the increasing burden by a budget deficit, 
financed by state bonds or loans, or straightforward money 
creation. Obviously this causes inflation and a rising interest 
burden, which in the long-run is impossible to support. Another 
way is simply to ignore non-employability and to keep the poten- 
tial beneficiaries at their jobs as much as possible. Obviously 
this policy is impossible for private firms but state-owned 
enterprises can do it, in which case there will be a state 
subsidy to the firm that is paid out to the really non-employable 
part of the labor force. There is hidden non-employability and 
part of the paid wages are really hidden social security bene- 
fits. 
Non-employability is clearly a relative concept. It depends 
on the prevailing wage rate. A person who is non-employable at 
a wage of $2000 may be employable for $1000. If a state-firm 
pays this worker $2000, it implies that he would be paid $1000 
for his work plus $1000 hidden social benefits. In the West the 
remaining productivity would not be used and the individual 
would get $2000 in benefits without any additional effort. It 
follows that a social security system of this type may be cheaper 
than the normal Western type. However, in Holland, the USA, 
and other countries, there are "protected factories" for 
physically and mentally handicapped where the wages of the 
commercially non-employables are subsidized by the state. 
INFLATION AND WAGE INDEXATION 
One of  t h e  major  advan tages  o f - a  pay-as-you-go-system 
compared w i t h  p r i v a t e  i n s u r a n c e ,  s o c i a l  i n s u r a n c e ,  o r  a  c a p i t a l -  
fo rmat ion  sys tem i s  i t s  immunity t o  i n f l a t i o n .  I f  p r i c e s  
i n c r e a s e  10 p e r c e n t ,  and nominal incomes i n c r e a s e  by 10 p e r c e n t ,  
t h e r e  i s  no problem t o  i n c r e a s e  b e n e f i t s  by 10 p e r c e n t  a s  w e l l .  
I n  many c o u n t r i e s  t h i s  i s  an  au toma t i c  p rocedure .  The r e a l  
s o c i a l  burden w i l l  n o t  change. However, i s  t h i s  immunity bene- 
f i c i a l  from a macroeconomic p o i n t  of  view? 
The p r i c e - i ndex  l i n k a g e  o f  wages and b e n e f i t s  i s  e v i d e n t l y  
a  f a c t o r  t h a t  s u s t a i n s  t h e  upward s u r g e  of  p r i c e s .  A major 
c a u s e  o f  t h e  worldwide i n f l a t i o n  i n  t h e  l a s t  decade i s  c e r t a i n l y  
due  t o  t h e  au toma t i c  i n f l a t i o n  c o r r e c t i o n  b u i l t  i n t o  wages and 
t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  s t r u c t u r e .  I n f l a t i o n  i s  c e r t a i n l y  d e t r i m e n t a l  
f o r  peop le  who s a v e  money o r  i n v e s t  t h e i r  funds  i n  nominal 
a c c o u n t s ,  bonds,  non-indexed l i f e  i n s u r a n c e ,  o r  a n n u i t i e s .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  i n f l a t i o n  h a s  an un favo rab l e  e f f e c t  on i nves tmen t s  
i n t e n d e d  f o r  o ld-age  p e n s i o n s ,  b u t  w i l l  have a f a v o r a b l e  e f f e c t  
on a s e c u r i t y  sys tem s t r u c t u r e d  a s  a  pay-as-you-go b a s i s .  A s  
i n f l a t i o n  h a s  a n  impor t an t  and n e g a t i v e  impact  on t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
p o s i t i o n  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e ,  w e  may i n f e r  t h a t  t h e  p r i c e  
l i n k  w i l l  a l s o  have  a n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  on t h e  e x t e r n a l  p o s i t i o n  
of  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  b r i n g i n g  more peop le  on t h e  d o l e .  W e  s u s p e c t  
t h a t  p r i c e  i n d e x a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  imminent i n s t a b i l i t y  of  t h e  
sys tem.  
Wage i n d e x a t i o n  i s  aimed a t  l i n k i n g  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e n e f i t s  
w i t h  t h e  r e a l  wages o f  t h e  employed i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  Th i s  
t y p e  o f  l i n k a g e  i s  a r i s k y  a f f a i r .  
The reason  f o r  such a l i n k a g e  i s  t h a t  t h e  long-term rise 
i n  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and t h e  subsequen t  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  wages 
would be s h a r e d  by t h e  nonac t i ve  popu l a t i on .  The l i n k a g e  of  
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  w i t h  i n c r e a s e s  i n  r e a l  wage i s  based  on f e e l i n g s  
of s o l i d a r i t y  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  nonac t i ve  p o p u l a t i o n  shou ld  
s h a r e  i n  t h e  economic growth o f  t h e  economy. However, it 
r a i s e s  s e v e r a l  problems.  
(a) What if real wages decrease? It would be a difficult 
policy to reduce social benefits. It follows that 
there is a strong tendency to deal asymmetrically with 
social security indexation. If real wages increase, 
real benefits increase accordingly. If real wages 
fall, then real benefits remain constant by linkage 
to the price-index. This option is especially popular 
as social beneficiaries are in a weak political and 
economic position. It is obvious that such an asym- 
metric policy would enhance the system's instability. 
(b) The rise in labor productivity is frequently due to 
automation or the introduction of new technology. 
Automation is often preceded by expenditures to new 
investments. It follows that the investment may well 
lead via wage increases to an increase of social bene- 
fits, and hence an increase in the employer's contribu- 
tion to the program. Obviously this demotivates invest- 
ment activity, except for the labor-substituting type 
in order to reduce the increasing social premium burden. 
However, if labor is replaced by capital, the social 
benefit burden will increase. 
(c) By tying the level of social benefits to real wages 
in the private sector, we run the risk of a relatively 
small and decreasing number of privately employed workers 
determining the course of social security benefits. 
For instance in Holland the number of workers in the 
private sector is about 3.5 million, while the number 
of workers in the state sector is 1 million and the 
number of beneficiaries is 3 million (i.e., those who 
fully depend on social security). 
The solidarity argument is strong if there are only a 
few beneficiaries compared with private sector workers. 
However, the argument loses its value if the number of 
beneficiaries grows larger and larger. 
Summarizing t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  i ndexa t ion  of 
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e n e f i t s  t o  e i t h e r  p r i c e s  and/or wages d e s t a b i -  
l i z e s  t h e  system, a l though  it does no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  imply t h a t  
t h e  system w i l l  explode.  
8 .  C ONFLICTING INTERESTS, THE POLITICAL DILEMMA 
I n  t h e  prev ious  pages w e  s t u d i e d  t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
phenomenon from an economic s t andpo in t .  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w e  
want t o  cons ide r  t h e  i s s u e  from a  p o l i t i c a l  dimension. 
I t  cannot  be  denied t h a t  t h e  mass of b e n e f i c i a r i e s  i n  a  
country  have one common i n t e r e s t :  main ta in ing  o r ,  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  
improving t h e i r  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e n e f i t s .  A s  such,  they  have 
a s  t h e i r  n a t u r a l  adversary  t h o s e  workers who e a r n  a  primary 
income. These s a m e  workers are a l s o  t h e  sou rce  of income f o r  
t h e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s ,  b u t  t h i s  does n o t  imply a  deep f e e l i n g  of 
g r a t i t u d e  among t h e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e r e  i s  
a  cons ide rab le  chance t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  w i l l  c l u s t e r  
t o g e t h e r ,  based on t h e i r  j o i n t  i n t e r e s t s ,  i n  a p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y .  
A new c l a s s  s t r u g g l e  might r e s u l t  between t h o s e  w i th  a  primary 
income and those  w i thou t  one. 
I t  is c l e a r  t h a t  such a  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  may be one t h a t  
a l r eady  e x i s t s  such as a s o c i a l i s t  o r  l e f t i s t  p a r t y ,  a f a s c i s t  
p a r t y ,  o r  one t h a t  w i l l  be newly founded. I n  a  democrat ic  mu l t i -  
p a r t y  system t h i s  imp l i e s  t h a t  such a group of "have-nots" may 
become a powerful p a r t y  indeed.  S ince  many members of o t h e r  
p a r t i e s  may be f u t u r e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  a s  w e l l ,  it fo l lows  t h a t  
a l s o  t h e  o t h e r s  may be  inc luded  t o  sympathize wi th  t h e  objec-  
t i v e s  of  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r y  p a r t y .  
A s  w e  have a t tempted t o  p o i n t  o u t  i n  t h e  prev ious  pages ,  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  programs i n  an economy i s  a  
d e s t a b i l i z i n g  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  economic system as a whole. I t  
i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e r e  is  a p r o b a b i l i t y  b u t  n o t  a  c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  
t h e  system w i l l  explode because of a crowding-out phenomenon. 
Hence, i t  i s  bo th  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of  t h e  workers and t h e  bene- 
f i c i a r i e s  t o  keep t h e  s i z e  of  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e n e f i t s  modest 
s o  t h a t  t h e  hen wi th  t h e  golden egg i s  n o t  k i l l e d .  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand, a  b e n e f i c i a r y  p a r t y  would be tempted t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  scope 
and magnitude of t h e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  system t o  a t t r a c t  more vo te s .  
Therefore ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  economic i n s t a b i l i t y  caused by a  
l i b e r a l  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  system, t h e r e  i s  a  p o l i t i c a l  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  
f a c t o r .  Consequently,  it i s  doub t fu l  whether a  c o n s i s t e n t l y  more 
comprehensive s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  system can l a s t  f o r  decades wi thout  
an uproot ing  of t h e  economic system a s  a  whole.* 
The prev ious  remarks r e f e r  t o  m u l t i p a r t y  systems.  I t  would, 
however, be s h o r t s i g h t e d  t o  r e s t r i c t  o u r s e l v e s  t o  t h o s e  s t a t e  
systems. I n  a  one-party system it may be  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
b e n e f i c i a r i e s  t o  vo ice  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  However, it may be  
f ea red  t h a t  i n  such a  system t h e r e  comes a  t i m e  when t h e  bene- 
f i c i a r i e s  w i l l  f i g h t  f o r  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  u s ing  nonpar l iamentary 
means. I n  bo th  c a s e s  a  d i a l e c t i c  p rocess  ending i n  a  r e v o l u t i o n  
may n o t  be  improbable. 
9 .  THE RETIREMENT PROBLEM 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  w e  s h a l l  become somewhat more s p e c i f i c  by 
cons ide r ing  a  s p e c i a l  s o c i a l  program. The e l i g i b i l i t y  c r i t e r i o n  
i s  age.  The s t r u c t u r e  of such a  program i s  t h a t  t h e  young pay 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  suppor t  t h e  o l d  who g e t  an old-age pension.  
The age l i m i t  i s  set  a t  65, a l though  it may vary from between 
50 t o  70 among programs. 
For such a  system a  c r i t i c a l  v a r i a b l e  i s  t h e  dependency 
r a t i o ,  t h a t  i s  t h e  p ropor t ion  between t h e  old-aged At(65) and 
t h e  working popu la t ion  L t ( 6 5 ) .  The r a t i o  A(65)/L(65)  depends 
- - 
*At this p o i n t  a s  an i n t e r r u p t i o n  w e  have t o  cons ide r  t h e  Key- 
nes i an  i d e a  about  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y .  I t  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  thought  
t h a t  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  is  a  s t a b i l i z i n g  component a s  it would 
uphold e f f e c t i v e  demand i n  t h e  downswing of t h e  bus ines s  c y c l e .  
However, t h i s  i s  only  t r u e  i f  t h e  marginal  p ropens i ty  t o  con- 
sume would r e a l l y  d i f f e r  between h igh  and low income e r r o r s .  
Given t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c l a s s  of self-employed i s  vanish ing  and 
t h a t  most p r i v a t e  s av ings  of  workers a r e  by means of o b l i g a t o r y  
pension c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  s t a b i l i z i n g  i n f l u -  
ence i s  minor. 
on t h e  demographic age d i s t r i b u t i o n .  I f  t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  and 
t h e  dea th  r a t e  6 a r e  c o n s t a n t ,  we c a l l  t h e  popu la t ion  i n  s t a t i o n -  
a r y  growth. I n  such a  s i t u a t i o n  t h e  dependency r a t i o  i s  a  
dec reas ing  f u n c t i o n  of t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  and t h e  dea th  r a t e .  
I f  t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  f a l l s ,  it imp l i e s  t h a t  t h e  long-term 
dependency r a t i o  w i l l  i nc rease .  However, b e f o r e  coming i n t o  
i t s  new growth p a t h ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be a  t r a n s i t i o n  pe r iod  dur ing  
which t i m e  t h e r e  w i l l  be  some overshoot ing .  The behavior  i s  
ske tched  i n  F igu re  3 ,  where t h e  pa th  from t h e  i n i t i a l  r a t i o  a t  





Figure  3 .  The behavior  of t h e  dependency r a t i o .  
I f  t h e  pension r a t e  i s  r ,  t h e  pay-as-you-go-system d e t e r -  
mines t h e  pension c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  be ~r where 
I t  fo l lows  t h a t  f o r  f a l l i n g  b i r t h  r a t e s  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of 
t h e  working popu la t ion  have t o  i n c r e a s e ,  and q u i t e  cons ide rab ly ,  
i n  o r d e r  t o  suppor t  t h e  aged a t  t h e  p rev ious ly  f i x e d  l e v e l  6 .  
The problem i s  aggravated dur ing  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  p e r i o d ,  
which may f o r  p r a c t i c a l  purposes be  eva lua t ed  by s e v e r a l  decades.  
W e  have a s s e s s e d  t h a t  f o r  some c o u n t r i e s  pens ion  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  
may have t o  be  doubled.  T h i s  pose s  a  problem t o  i n t e r g e n e r a -  
t i o n a l  s o l i d a r i t y .  I n  t h e  y e a r s  ahead,  and around t h e  y e a r  2000, 
t h e  aged w i l l  f e e l  j u s t i f i e d  i n  o b t a i n i n g  t h e  same pens ion  t h a t  
t h e y  w e r e  a b l e  t o  g i v e  t h e i r  f a t h e r s .  However, t h e  t h e n  working 
g e n e r a t i o n  f e e l s  o n l y  an  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  pay t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
t h e i r  f a t h e r s  p a i d .  Logic  s u g g e s t s  t h r e e  p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s :  
( 1 )  a  f a l l  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t  l e v e l  
( 2 )  a  rise of  t h e  premium 
( 3 )  a  r e d e f i n i t i o n  of  "old-aged" ,  e .g . ,  by s e t t i n g  t h e  
r e t i r e m e n t  age  a t  6 7  
The problem i s  n o t  s o l v e d  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  a l t hough  t h e  US 
p o l i c y  seems t o  t e n d  t o  t h e  f i n a l  s o l u t i o n .  The problem is, 
however, the number o f  jobs .  I f  more peop le  of  t h e  o l d e r  genera-  
t i o n  s t a y  on t h e  job ,  t h e  unemployment problem w i l l  b e  aggra-  
v a t e d  f o r  t h o s e  who e n t e r  t h e  l a b o r  market .  
A second problem is t h a t  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  age  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  
based  on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  many peop l e  o f  6 6  a r e  unab le  t o  work, 
a l t h o u g h  a s  a  r u l e  o f  thumb it i s  n o t  a  ve ry  a c c u r a t e  c r i t e r i o n  
and may be  u n j u s t  i n  some i n d i v i d u a l  c a s e s .  T he re fo r e  an  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  age  may be  tantamount  t o  a  d e t e r i o r a -  
t i o n  i n  t h e  q u a l i t y  of  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e ,  and t h i s  p o l i c y  may f o r c e  
some f i r m s  t o  employ p eo p l e  who c o n t r i b u t e  less t h a n  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  t h e i r  wages t o  t h e  f i r m .  
The problem o f  employment does  n o t  appea r  t o  be  much o f  a  
problem. Undoubtedly t h e r e  w i l l  b e  t r a n s i t i o n  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
b u t  w e  do b e l i e v e  i n  t h e  Law of Say i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  new jobs  
w i l l  c r e a t e  t h e i r  own demand. However s e v e r e  problems may 
appear  t o  b e  i n  t h e  s h o r t  r u n ,  t h e y  w i l l  have a  tendency t o  work 
themse lves  o u t  i n  t h e  long  run .  
The second problem appea r s  t o  b e  much more c r i t i c a l .  I n  
my o p i n i o n  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  age  shou ld  be  a  v a r i a b l e ,  de te rmined  
by medica l  examina t ion  and o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r s .  I t  might 
w e l l  b e  t h a t  r e t i r e m e n t  i s  a  g r a d u a l  p r o c e s s  i n  two r e s p e c t s .  
The wage o f  old-aged may be g r a d u a l l y  r e p l a c e d  by s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
b e n e f i t s  and t h e  t i m e  t h e  e l d e r l y  spend on t h e i r  job  may grad- 
u a l l y  f a l l  from f u l l - t i m e  t o  pa r t - t ime ,  and e v e n t u a l l y  t o  no- 
t i m e .  I n  t h i s  way t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  problem may be  smoothly so lved .  
10. THE SOARING HEALTH COST PROBLEM 
One o f  t h e  more impor t an t  problems i n  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i s  
s o a r i n g  h e a l t h  c o s t s .  They a r e  covered i n  most c o u n t r i e s  by 
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y ,  a l t hough  t h e r e  i s  a  tremendous v a r i a t i o n  i n  
t h e  s p e c i f i c  modes o f  f i n a n c i a l  coverage.  I n  most developed 
c o u n t r i e s  t h e  s h a r e  of  n e a l t h  c o s t s  has  r i s e n  t o  about  10 per -  
c e n t  o f  t h e  GNP. This  e v o l u t i o n  r a i s e s  s e v e r a l  q u e s t i o n s .  
F i r s t ,  what a r e  t h e  r ea sons ;  second,  a r e  t hey  r ea sons  f o r  p a n i c ;  
t h i r d , i s  it l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  growth w i l l  con t inue ;  and fou r th ,  
how do w e  c o u n t e r a c t  t h i s  t r e n d ?  
The main r ea sons  f o r  e v e r  i n c r e a s i n g  h e a l t h  c o s t s  seem t o  
be t h e  fo l l owing :  
( 1 )  Medical  t echnology  has  expanded tremendously i n  t h e  
l a s t  c en tu ry  and hence i t s  c o s t .  
( 2 )  Due t o  t h a t  expansion w e  have undone p a r t  of  t h e  
Darwinian p r i n c i p l e  o f  t h e  " s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  f i t t e s t " .  
Although t h e  p r e s e n t  h e a l t h  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  popu la t i on  
has  been improved compared w i th  t h e  p a s t ,  most o f  u s  
w i l l  have su rv ived  major i l l n e s s e s  and o p e r a t i o n s ,  
which would have k i l l e d  u s  i n  t h e  p a s t .  The g e n e t i c  
h e a l t h  q u a l i t y  of  t h e  a d u l t  p o p u l a t i o n  may be worsened. 
( 3 )  A c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a r t  o f  o u r  h e a l t h  c o s t s  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
caused by smoking, a lcohol i sm,  and o t h e r  unhea l thy  
consumption h a b i t s .  
( 4 )  I n  o u r  p resen t -day  s o c i e t y ,  medical legitimation i s  a  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  d i s a b i l i t y  o r  s i c k n e s s  b e n e f i t s ,  even i f  
peop le  have o t h e r  r e a s o n s  f o r  q u i t t i n g  t h e i r  job.  
Th i s  h o l d s  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  psychosomatic d i s e a s e s  and 
p s y c h i a t r i c  t r e a t m e n t .  I t  fo l l ows  t h a t  t h e  medical  
p r o f e s s i o n  i s  p a r t l y  used f o r  improper purposes .  
(5) A final reason for soaring health costs is the mono- 
polistic supply behavior of the medical profession 
and health insurance companies. In many countries 
there is a medical cartel that can supply and sell 
its products without any difficulty and fix itsprices 
at the level it wants. 
A solution to the latter problem is a market reform that should 
entail : 
(1) a greater supply of medical education 
(2) more competition among doctors and more competition 
for job vacancies where there is a demand for doctors 
(3) a strong control by outside agencies to represent the 
interests of the patients 
Having enumerated the reasons of the growth of health care 
costs, it is clear that there is no reason for panic. It is 
just one of the costs of our rising welfare. It is our assess- 
ment that the growth in health care costs will be slowed in 
most countries at the present level or at less than the present 
level. The ways in which we may try to dampen this growth is 
now clear as we have suggested in points (3) , (4) , (5) above, 
that is to say: 
(1) Consumption habits should be improved. This may be 
done in a dictatorial way. However, a more democratic 
way seems to be to charge the r e a l  costs for that type 
of consumption. For alcoholic beverages it implies 
that not only the production cost should be paid but 
also a surcharge to cover the future additional 
health care costs p l u s  the production losses incurred 
by prematurely quitting the labor force. 
(2) The doctor's role as controller to legitimize the 
wish for leisure, and social security benefits, should 
be transferred to non-medical agents. 
(3) Ways should be found to reorganize medical markets. 
One interesting way seems to be the Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) where a medical organization com- 
prising hospitals and general practitioners receives a 
fixed amount per year to keep a person in good health. 
The reward is totally unrelated to medical production 
activities, but only to beneficial outcomes. 
11. CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS 
At this point it will be evident that the scope of the 
social security is enormous. By definition it does not conform 
to market forces, and it seems to be ridden with potential and 
imminent instability. Whether the system will get out of hand 
or not is not'easy to determine. It depends on the specific 
constellation of parameters combined with the behavior of various 
parties, especially employers and employees. But there can be 
no doubt that the increase in the size of social security systems 
has an impact on the whole economic system and that this impact 
will be in the direction of crowding-out. In addition, there 
is the risk of a total collapse of the economy if the social 
security is of sufficient magnitude. 
(1) Therefore our research priority should be to: 
investigate the general structure of social security 
systems and determine the demarcation line between 
stability and instability. (This can be done to a 
large extent by means of a simulation technique.) 
( 2 )  Study in detail the choice between capital-formation, 
pay-as-you-go, and government coverage. 
(3) Obtain empirical evidence on the behavior of changing 
social security systems. It seems advisable to make 
international comparative studies. Countries can serve 
as different observations in a world laboratory. 
(4) Collect micro-data on the behavior of parties involved. 
For instance we may study: 
( a )  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  i n  v a r i o u s  c o u n t r i e s  t o  
de te rmine  t h e  f i r m ' s  r e a c t i o n  on wage c o s t  changes 
( b )  t h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  l a b o r  supp ly  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  n e t  
wages 
( c )  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  of  
age  
( d )  t h e  medica l  consumption behav io r  of  p a t i e n t s  under 
v a r i o u s  i n s u r a n c e  regimes 
(e) t h e  supp ly  behav ior  of d o c t o r s  under v a r i o u s  
f i n a n c i a l  regimes  
W e  do n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  p o l i c y  shou ld  w a i t  f o r  r e s e a r c h  r e s u l t s .  
I f  a n  emergency a r i s e s  a s  ha s  been t h e  c a s e  i n  some c o u n t r i e s ,  
measures c an  t h e n  b e  t a k e n  t h a t  l e a d  i n  t h e  r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n .  
Such measures shou ld  b e  cons ide r ed  p r e l i m i n a r y ;  t h e y  shou ld  be  
modi f i ed  acco rd ing  t o  new r e s e a r c h  r e s u l t s  a s  t hey  become 
a v a i l a b l e .  
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HEALTH CARE OF THE ELDERLY 
G a i l  R .  ~ i l e n s k y * ,  S e n io r  Researcher  
Nat iona l  Cen ter  fo r  Heal th  S e r v i c e s  Research,** 
US Department o f  Hea l th  and Human S e r v i c e s ,  
R o c k v i Z l e ,  Maryland, USA 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
The t o p i c  "Hea l th  Care  o f  t h e  E l d e r l y " ,  which ha s  become 
t h e  focus  o f  i n t e n s e  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and e l s ewhe re ,  
d e a l s  w i t h  b o t h  h e a l t h  c a r e  and t h e  e l d e r l y .  Concern abou t  
h e a l t h  c a r e  h a s  c e n t e r e d  on t h e  r a p i d  and s u s t a i n e d  r a t e  of  
i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p e n d i t u r e s  t h a t  h a s  occu r r ed  ove r  t h e  p a s t  two 
decades ;  concern  abou t  t h e  e l d e r l y  ha s  c e n t e r e d  on o u r  r a p i d l y  
a g i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  and t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  demographic s h i f t  
on a whole r an g e  o f  p u b l i c  programs,  of  which h e a l t h  i s  on ly  
one. Both s u b j e c t s  have r e c e n t l y  r e c e i v e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n  
th rough  su ch  mee t ings  a s  t h e  World Conference on Aging sponsored 
by t h e  Uni ted  Nat ions  t h i s  p a s t  summer and t h e  American P u b l i c  
Hea l th  A s s o c i a t i o n s  meet ing h e l d  on ly  a few weeks ago w i t h  i t s  
theme " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P e r s p e c t i v e s  on Aging". What I w i l l  do i n  
*I am g r a t e f u l  t o  Mary Grace Kovar and Jacob  Feldman of  t h e  
N a t i o na l  Cen te r  f o r  Hea l th  S t a t i s t i c s  and t o  Mark Meiners  o f  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  Cen te r  f o r  Hea l th  S e r v i c e s  Research f o r  s h a r i n g  
t h e i r  t h o u g h t s  and e x p e r t i s e  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e i r  d a t a .  
**The views ex p r e s sed  i n  t h i s  paper  a r e  t h o s e  of  t h e  a u t h o r  
and no o f f i c i a l  endorsement by t h e  Na t i ona l  C en t e r  f o r  Hea l th  
S e r v i c e s  Research i s  i n t ended  o r  shou ld  be i n f e r r e d .  
t h i s  paper  i s  b r i e f l y  r ev iew some of  t h e  v a s t  amount o f  informa- 
t i o n  on t h i s  s u b j e c t ,  which h a s  r e c e n t l y  become a v a i l a b l e .  The 
d a t a  w i l l  be a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  from t h e  US b u t  o c c a s i o n a l  r e f e r e n c e  
w i l l  b e  made t o  t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  of  e x p e r i e n c e s  w i t h  o t h e r  indus -  
t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .  
2. HEALTH EXPENDITURE PATTERNS 
T o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on h e a l t h  c a r e  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  p e r  c a p i t a  and h e a l t h  c a r e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a s  a  p e r c e n t  
o f  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t  a r e  shown i n  T a b l e  1 .  S e v e r a l  p o i n t s  
a r e  c l e a r  from t h e  t a b l e .  F i r s t ,  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n c r e a s e d  sub- 
s t a n t i a l l y  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  1965-1981, from $42 b i l l i o n  t o  
$287 b i l l i o n .  Second, most of  t h i s  growth h a s  l i t t l e  t o  do w i t h  
any a b s o l u t e  growth i n  p o p u l a t i o n  s i n c e  t h e  growth i n  e x p e n d i t u r e s  
p e r  c a p i t a  i s  o n l y  s l i g h t l y  s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e  growth i n  t o t a l  
spend ing ,  from $211 t o  $1,225.  T h i r d ,  h e a l t h  c a r e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  
have  been growing a t  a  more r a p i d  r a t e  t h a n  o t h e r  sectors of  t h e  
economy. H e a l t h  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  GNP h a s  grown 
from 6  p e r c e n t  i n  1965 t o  9 .8  p e r c e n t  i n  1981. Fur the rmore ,  
t h e r e  a r e  no s i g n s  t h a t  t h i s  d i f f e r e n t i a l  growth r a t e  i s  a b a t i n g .  
From 1980 t o  1981, t o t a l  h e a l t h  c a r e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  i n c r e a s e d  by 
15.1 p e r c e n t ,  whereas  t h e  o v e r a l l  GNP i n c r e a s e d  by 11.4 p e r c e n t  
and i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  1982 w i l l  
be much d i f f e r e n t .  
There  a r e  a  v a r i e t y  o f  r e a s o n s  t h a t  have  been g i v e n  t o ,  
e x p l a i n  t h e  r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  c o s t s  i n  t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s .  One r e a s o n  f r e q u e n t l y  c i t e d  i s  o u r  m o s t l y  p r i v a t e  sys tem 
o f  h e a l t h  i n s u r a n c e  w i t h  i t s  pr imary  r e l i a n c e  on f e e  f o r  s e r v i c e  
medic ine .  While t h e r e  a r e  numerous s t u d i e s  s u p p o r t i n g  t h i s  
h y p o t h e s i s ,  c a s u a l  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  t h e  European e x p e r i e n c e  sug- 
g e s t s  t h a t  it i s  more t h a n  j u s t  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  
o f  t h e  US t h a t  a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  rise. Table  2  shows 
e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  med ica l  c a r e  a s  a  p e r c e n t  of  GNP f o r  s e v e r a l  
o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  I t  i s  obvious  from t h e s e  f i g u r e s  t h a t  t h e  US 
i s  n o t  a l o n e  i n  e x p e r i e n c i n g  a  r a p i d  growth i n  h e a l t h  c a r e  
Table  1 .  US n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  1965-1981. 
Total Expendi tures Ekpendi tures 
expenditures per as % of 
(in bi l l ions)  Person GNP 
SOURCE: Pear  1982. 
Tab le  2. Expendi tu res  f o r  medical  c a r e  a s  a  p e r c e n t  o f  g r o s s  





United K i n g d d  
West Germany 
a  The Uni ted  Kingdom i n c l u d e s  Grea t  B r i t a i n  (England,  Wales, 
and S c o t l a n d )  and Nor thern  I r e l a n d .  
SOURCE: 1969 d a t a  from Simanis  1973, p. 39 
1975 d a t a  s u p p l i e d  by t h e  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  Adminis t ra-  
t i o n .  C i t e d  i n  Pechman 1980, p. 187. 
e x p e n d i t u r e s .  A second r ea son  o f t e n  c i t e d  i s  t h e  con t i nued  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  new and expens ive  medical  t r e a t m e n t s  and t e ch -  
n o l o g i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  absence  o f  e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t  
s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  r a t i o n i n g  t h e s e  t e c h n o l o g i e s .  A t h i r d  r e a son  
and one o f  p a r t i c u l a r  concern  t o  t h i s  paper  i s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  a  r a p i d l y  a g i n g  p o p u l a t i o n .  T h i s ,  a g a i n ,  i s  n o t  a  pheno- 
menon unique t o  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  A s  shown i n  Tab le  3 many 
European c o u n t r i e s  a r e  a l r e a d y  e x p e r i e n c i n g  what t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  i s  expec t ed  t o  encoun t e r  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .  
That  an ag ing  p o p u l a t i o n  can have profound i m p l i c a t i o n s  
on t h e  u s e  o f  h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  and t h e  c o s t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  
u s e  of  t h e s e  s e r v i c e s  i s  shown i n  Tab les  4 and 5.  Tab le  4 shows 
t h a t  t h e  e l d e r l y  a r e  h o s p i t a l i z e d  50 p e r c e n t  more o f t e n  t han  
t h e  g e n e r a l  p o p u l a t i o n ,  s t a y  50 p e r c e n t  l o n g e r ,  have a lmos t  50 
p e r c e n t  more p h y s i c i a n  v i s i t s  and u se  t w i c e  a s  many p r e s c r i p t i o n  
medic ines  ( n o t  shown i n  Tab le  4 ) .  S i m i l a r l y  t h e  aged account  
f o r  a  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on h e a l t h  c a r e .  
Pe rsons  aged 65 and o v e r  comprise 11 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
b u t  accoun t  f o r  o v e r  29 p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  h e a l t h  c a r e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  
(Tab le  5 ) .  I n  p e r  c a p i t a  t e rms ,  t h e  aged s p e n t  $2026 b i l l i o n :  
2 . 5  t i m e s  t h e  amount s p e n t  by t h o s e  19-64 and 7 t i m e s  t h e  amount 
s p e n t  by t h o s e  under age  19. There i s  a l s o  something unique 
abou t  t h e  h e a l t h  u t i l i z a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  o f  t h e  e l d e r l y  n o t  imp l i ed  
by T a b l e  4 ,  which i s  l i k e l y  t o  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  impor t an t  
i n  t h e  coming decades - the i r  use  o f  n u r s i n g  home s e r v i c e s .  
Unl ike  o t h e r  age  g roups ,  n u r s i n g  home c a r e  fo l lowed  h o s p i t a l  
c a r e  a s  t h e  second most expens ive  h e a l t h  i t e m  f o r  t h e  aged.  
I t  accounted  f o r  abou t  25 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  t h i s  
group o r  abou t  $518 p e r  c a p i t a  ( F i s h e r  1980) .  For  a l l  o t h e r  
a g e  g roups ,  p h y s i c i a n  s e r v i c e s  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  second l e a d i n g  
e x p e n d i t u r e  c a t e g o r y .  Given t h e  u s e  and e x p e n d i t u r e  p a t t e r n s  
o u t l i n e d  above,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  a  changing age  s t r u c t u r e  i n  a  
p o p u l a t i o n  can s e v e r e l y  a f f e c t  i t s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on h e a l t h  ser- 
v i c e s .  
Table 3. Population age 65 and over as a percentage of total population, selected 
countries. 




Germany, Federal Republic of 
Netherlands 




SOURCE: Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate. 
Table  4 .  P e r c e n t a g e  of p e r s o n s  h o s p i t a l i z e d ,  days  p e r  p a t i e n t ,  p h y s i c i a n  v i s i t s ,  
and p r e s c r i p t i o n s  p e r  c a p i t a ,  n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  p e r s o n s  by age  g roup ,  
1978. 
Percent Short -s tay Physician Prescriptions 
of persons hospital days v i s i t s  per 
43 group hospitalized per patient per capita capita (1973) 




65 and 0-r 
SOURCE: F i s h e r  1980, p .  67. 





spending Fopulat ion Rer capita Health care 
(in bi l l ions)  ( in millions) spend ing spending Fbpulat ion 
A l l  ages 
Under 19 
19-64 
65 and over 
SOURCE: F i s h e r  1980, p.  6 6 .  
3. DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS 
The p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  popula-  
t i o n  o f  many European c o u n t r i e s ,  i s  ag ing  r a p i d l y .  T h i s  i n c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  amount o f  e l d e r l y  peop l e  i s  o c c u r r i n g  i n  b o t h  a b s o l u t e  
and r e l a t i v e  terms. I t  i s  a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  i n  an  i n c r e a s i n g  
dependency r a t i o - t h a t  i s  t h e  r a t i o  of  t h o s e  i n  t h e  "dependent"  
65 and o l d e r  p o p u l a t i o n  t o  t h o s e  i n  t h e  " suppo r t i ng"  18-64 age  
group.  
Numbers of  Older  Persons  
The a b s o l u t e  number of  o l d e r  pe r sons  i s  one impor t an t  
f a c t o r  i n  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  age-based h e a l t h  u t i l i z a t i o n .  I n  
1930, t h e  US p o p u l a t i o n  65 and o l d e r  numbered 6.6 m i l l i o n ;  by 
1980 it had i n c r e a s e d  t o  25.9 m i l l i o n .  During t h e  p e r i o d  1930- 
1980, t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  e l d e r l y  p o p u l a t i o n  was 292 p e r c e n t ,  
whereas t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  was o n l y  89 p e r c e n t .  
T a b l e  6  shows t h e  number and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  pe r sons  by a g e  
and s e x  from t h e  p e r i o d  1960-2080. The t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  
US i s  p r o j e c t e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  from 232.7 m i l l i o n  i n  1980 t o  365 
m i l l i o n  i n  2080. The p o p u l a t i o n  o v e r  65 i s  p r o j e c t e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  
from 25.9 m i l l i o n  i n  1980 t o  75.9 m i l l i o n  i n  2080. During t h i s  
p e r i o d ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  e l d e r l y  p o p u l a t i o n  r e l a -  
t i v e  t o  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  i s  even g r e a t e r  t h a n  it was d u r i n g  
t h e  1930-1970 p e r i o d ,  193 p e r c e n t  v e r s u s  57 p e r c e n t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
The number o f  t h e  "old1'  e l d e r l y  ha s  a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  r a p i d l y .  
From 1960-1980, when t h e  o v e r a l l  e l d e r l y  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e d  by 
55 p e r c e n t ,  pe r sons  75-84 i n c r e a s e d  by 65 p e r c e n t  and t h o s e  aged 
85 and o v e r  i n c r e a s e d  by 174 p e r c e n t .  T h i s  t r e n d  i s  expec ted  
t o  c o n t i n u e .  Whereas t h e  o v e r a l l  e l d e r l y  p o p u l a t i o n  i s  p r o j e c t e d  
t o  i n c r e a s e  by 193 p e r c e n t  between t h e  y e a r s  2080 and 1980, t h e  
75-84-year-old p o p u l a t i o n  i s  p r o j e c t e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  by 210 pe r -  
c e n t  and t h e  85 and o v e r  age  group by 595 p e r c e n t .  
T a b l e  6 .  Number a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of p e r s o n s  by  a g e  a n d  sex:  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  1960-2080. 
Age and s e x  
T o t a l  
A l l  ages 
Under 20 y e a r s  o f  a g e  
2044 y e a r s  o f  age 
45-64 y e a r s  of  a g e  
65 y e a r s  and o v e r  
65-74 y e a r s  
75-84 y e a r s  
85 ard o v e r  
Male 
A l l  a g e s  
Under 20 y e a r s  of  age 
2044 y e a r s  o f  age 
45-64 y e a r s  o f  a g e  
65 y e a r s  and o v e r  
65-74 y e a r s  
75-81 y e a r s  
85 ard o v e r  
A l l  ages 
Under 20 y e a r s  o f  age 
2044 y e a r s  o f  age 
45-64 y e a r s  o f  a g e  
65 y e a r s  and o v e r  
65-74 y e a r s  
75-84 y e a r s  
85 and o v e r  
Number i n  M i l l i o n s  
SOURCE: S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  A c t u a r y ,  A c t u a r i a l  S t u d y  N o .  8 5 ,  
J u l y  1981. C i t e d  i n  R i c e  a n d  Feldman 1982. 
Table  6  a l s o  shows t h e  i n c r e a s e  by s ex .  While t h e  t r e n d  i s  
downward f o r  b o t h  men and women, t h e  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  a r e  s i g n i -  
f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  f o r  men and t h e  downtrend i s  somewhat s lower .  
Between 1960 and 2000, t h e  d e a t h  r a t e  f o r  women i s  p r o j e c t e d  t o  
d e c l i n e  by 45 p e r c e n t ;  t h e  r a t e  f o r  men by 34 p e r c e n t .  A s m a l l e r  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  i s  p r o j e c t e d  t o  occu r  a f t e r  t h e  y e a r  2000 ( R i c e  
and Feldman 1982) . 
P r o p o r t i o n  o f  Older  Persons  
The p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  popu l a t i on  aged 65 and o l d e r  h a s  a l s o  
been i n c r e a s i n g  r a p i d l y .  From 1930-1980, t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  aged 65 and o v e r  more t h a n  doubled,  from 5.4 p e r c e n t  
i n  1930 t o  11.1 p e r c e n t  i n  1980. Th i s  t r e n d  i s  expec t ed  t o  
c o n t i n u e  d u r i n g  t h e  n e x t  50 y e a r s  a s  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  ove r  65 i s  
p r o j e c t e d  t o  be ab o u t  19 p e r c e n t  i n  t h e  y e a r  2030. The propor-  
t i o n  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o v e r  65 i s  expec ted  t o  c o n t i n u e  a t  abou t  
20.5 p e r c e n t  f o r  t h e  50 y e a r s  f o l l owing  2030. 
The o l d  e l d e r l y  p o p u l a t i o n  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  n o t  o n l y  numeri- 
c a l l y  s i n c e  1980 b u t  a l s o  p r o p o r t i o n a l l y .  The p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o v e r  75 i s  expec ted  t o  grow from 4 . 4  p e r c e n t  i n  
1980 t o  11.5 p e r c e n t  i n  2040 and t o  remain a t  abou t  t h a t  l e v e l  
u n t i l  2080. 
Dependency R a t i o s  
The dependency r a t i o ,  t h a t  i s  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  ove r  65 r e l a -  
t i v e  t o  t h e  20-64 age  group,  i s  a l s o  p r o j e c t e d  t o  i n c r e a s e .  
The i n c r e a s e  between 1970 and 2000 is  expec t ed  t o  be  r e l a t i v e l y  
modest from 0.175 t o  0.225 fo l lowed  by a  d r a m a t i c  i n c r e a s e  
between 2000 and 2040 when t h e  r a t i o  i s  p r o j e c t e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  
from 0.225 t o  0.379, a f t e r  which t i m e  it w i l l  l e v e l  o f f .  While 
t h i s  s h a r p l y  i n c r e a s i n g  r a t i o  between t h e  s o - c a l l e d  dependent  
and s u p p o r t i n g  p o p u l a t i o n s  may have major  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
f i n a n c i n g  of p u b l i c  programs,  it shou ld  be i n t e r p r e t e d  w i t h  
c a u t i o n .  Not o n l y  a r e  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  p r o j e c t s  s u b j e c t  t o  a  
v a r i e t y  o f  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  b u t  a l s o  t h e r e  i s  a  growing d e b a t e  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  medical  and s o c i a l  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  age  65 be ing  
t h e  beg inn ing  o f  a  dependency p e r i o d .  
4 .  IMPLICATIONS OF AN A G I N G  POPULATION ON THE USE OF HEALTH 
SERVICES 
The a g i n g  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  w i l l  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  t h e  
use  o f  h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s .  A s  h a s  been n o t e d ,  t h e  e l d e r l y  t e n d  t o  
be s i c k e r ,  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  s u f f e r  from c h r o n i c  c o n d i t i o n s  
and a l r e a d y  account  f o r  a  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  s h a r e  of  h e a l t h  
e x p e n d i t u r e s .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  th roughout  t h e  1980s and beyond, 
h e a l t h  c a r e  e x p e n d i t u r e s  c an  b e  expec ted  t o  i n c r e a s e  bo th  i n  
a b s o l u t e  terms and r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy. 
T h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  f o r  s e r v i c e s  h e a v i l y  used by t h e  
e l d e r l y  such a s  n u r s i n g  homes. The p r o j e c t e d  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
number o f  women r e l a t i v e  t o  men, implying a n  i n c r e a s e d  number 
o f  women l i v i n g  a l o n e ,  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  even g r e a t e r  p r e s s u r e  on 
n u r s i n g  homes t h a n  would be  imp l i ed  by t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  numbers 
a l o n e .  Resea r ch e r s  a t  t h e  Hea l t h  Care  F inanc ing  Admin i s t r a t i on  
(Department of  H ea l t h  and Human S e r v i c e s )  p r e d i c t  t h a t  n u r s i n g  
home e x p e n d i t u r e s  w i l l  more t han  doub le  between 1978 and 1985 
and i n c r e a s e  more t h a n  400 p e r c e n t  by 1990. 
P r o j e c t i o n s  t h a t  go f u r t h e r  i n t o  t h e  f u t u r e  must be regarded  
w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c o n j e c t u r e  a s  t h e y  depend on assumed f u t u r e  
m o r b i d i t y  r a t e s  a s  w e l l  a s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  ar rangements  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  f i n a n c i n g  and d e l i v e r y  o f  c a r e .  None the less ,  Dorothy R i c e  
and Jacob  Feldman o f  t h e  US Na t iona l  C en t e r  f o r  Hea l t h  S t a t i s t i c s  
have  p r o j e c t e d  u t i l i z a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  c u r r e n t  
age-sex r a t e s  o f  a c t i v i t y  l i m i t a t i o n  and a p p l i e d  them t o  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  p r o j e c t i o n s  r e p o r t e d  e a r l i e r .  
R i c e  and Feldman (1982) p r e d i c t  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  i n c r e a s e  
i n  p h y s i c i a n  v i s i t s  s i n c e  t h i s  t ype  o f  c a r e  e x h i b i t s  less age- 
s p e c i f i c  v a r i a t i o n  t h a n  o t h e r  measures o f  u se .  However, s h o r t -  
t e r m  h o s p i t a l  s t a y s  a r e  p r e d i c t e d  t o  a lmos t  doub le  by 2040. 
S i m i l a r l y  t h e  number o f  n u r s i n g  home r e s i d e n t s  a r e  p r o j e c t e d  
t o  i n c r e a s e  by 2.5 t i m e s  between 1980 and 2040 and e x p e n d i t u r e s  
f o r  a l l  medical  s e r v i c e s  t o  i n c r e a s e  by 158 p e r c e n t  i n  r e a l  
t e r m s  ( i . e . ,  c o n s t a n t  d o l l a r s ) .  The r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  
11 p e r c e n t  of  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  who w e r e  e l d e r l y  i n  1980 accounted 
f o r  29 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  i n  2040 t h e  e l d e r l y  w i l l  
r e p r e s e n t  21 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  and accoun t  f o r  a lmos t  
h a l f  o f  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  
5. DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROVERSIES 
The demographic p r o j e c t i o n s  t h a t  form t h e  b a s i s  o f  u t i l i z a -  
t i o n  and e x p e n d i t u r e  p r o j e c t i o n s  w e r e  developed by t h e  a c t u a r i e s  
o f  t h e  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  A dmin i s t r a t i on  u s ing  t h e i r  i n t e r m e d i a t e  
assumpt ions .  A s  w i t h  any long-term p r o j e c t i o n s  t h e y  i n c l u d e  a  
v a r i e t y  o f  assumpt ions  t h a t  can be s u b j e c t  t o  q u e s t i o n  and i f  
a l t e r e d  can s u b s t a n t i a l l y  change t h e  outcome o f  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n .  
These assumpt ions  a r e  b r i e f l y  reviewed i n  t h e  s e c t i o n  below a long  
w i t h  some of  t h e  c u r r e n t  d e b a t e  r e g a r d i n g  morb id i t y  and m o r t a l i t y  
r a t e s .  
According t o  R i c e  and Feldman (1982) t h e  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  
a c t u a r i e s  assume a  f e r t i l i t y  r a t e  o f  2 . 1  c h i l d r e n  p e r  woman a s  
o f  t h e  y e a r  2005. The c u r r e n t  r a t e  i s  1.8.  The m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  
beg in  by i n c o r p o r a t i n g  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  d e c l i n e s  t h a t  w e r e  observed 
i n  t h e  p a s t  decade b u t  t h e s e  a r e  g r a d u a l l y  slowed s o  t h a t  t h e y  
r e a c h  very  c o n s e r v a t i v e  r a t e s  o f  d e c l i n e  a f t e r  t h e  y e a r  2005. 
A s  noted  e a r l i e r ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n  t h e  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  between 
men and women w i l l  widen s l i g h t l y .  
R e s u l t s  o f  t h e s e  p r o j e c t i o n  assumpt ions  t r a n s f o r m  popula- 
t i o n  pyramids i n t o  r e c t a n g l e s .  T h i s  i s  shown f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  
1960-2020 i n  F i g u r e  1. 
Assumptions r e g a r d i n g  m o r t a l i t y  t r e n d s  have been t h e  sub- 
j e c t  o f  c o n t r o v e r s y .  The pr imary t h e o r i e s  i n  c o n t e n t i o n  i n v o l v e  
t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  o f  b i o l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on m o r t a l i t y  changes 
( t h a t  i s  t h a t  s en escen ce  w i l l  soon l i m i t  l i f e  expectancy changes)  
v e r s u s  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  o f  s o c i e t a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on human m o r t a l i t y  

changes ( t h a t  i s  d e c l i n e s  i n  m o r t a l i t y  p r imar i ly  r e f l e c t  improve- 
ments i n  pub l i c  h e a l t h ) .  I n  a r e c e n t  a r t i c l e ,  Kenneth Manton 
(1982) a demographer from Duke Univers i ty  reviews t h e  evidence 
regard ing  both t h e o r i e s  and concludes t h a t  t h e r e  i s  minimal 
suppor t  t o  s u b s t a n t i a t e  hypotheses e i t h e r  of r e l e v a n t  b i o l o g i c a l  
o r  s o c i a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on l i f e  expectancy. The r e s u l t  could be 
an even g r e a t e r  growth i n  t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  e l d e r l y  popula t ion ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f t e r  2005, which would i n  t u r n  i n c r e a s e  t h e  demand 
f o r  h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  even f u r t h e r .  
Even more a t  issue.  a r e  t h e  assumptions regard ing  f u t u r e  
morbidi ty  r a t e s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  it i s  unc lea r  whether t h e  
d e c l i n i n g  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  w i l l  be a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  an i n c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  d u r a t i o n  of a chronic  i l l n e s s  and i f  s o  t h e  s e v e r i t y  
of t h a t  i l l n e s s  o r  whether t h e r e  w i l l  be a s h o r t e r  per iod  of 
morbid i ty  p r i o r  t o  dea th .  Manton sugges ts  t h a t  a l though t h e  
prevalence of ch ron ic  i l l n e s s  may i n c r e a s e ,  t h e  s e v e r i t y  and 
r a t e  of  progress ion  of t h e  primary d i s e a s e  may be reduced. 
Rice and Feldman conclude t h a t  t h e r e  could be both a compres- 
s i o n  of  morbidi ty  p r i o r  t o  dea th  f o r  some i n d i v i d u a l s  a s  w e l l  
a s  an apprec iab le  lengthening of  t h e  i l l n e s s  per iod  f o r  o t h e r  
segments of  t h e  popula t ion  b u t  t h a t  it  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  c u r r e n t l y  
t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  magnitude of  t h e s e  two popula t ions .  
The i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  h e a l t h  c a r e  c o s t s  of t h e s e  va r ious  a l t e r -  
n a t i v e s  may be s u b s t a n t i a l .  Attempts t o  reduce t h e  s e v e r i t y  of  
chronic  i l l n e s s  and slow i t s  r a t e  of  progress ion  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  
c o s t s ,  and t h e s e  c o s t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  a c c e l e r a t e  a s  l i f e  expect-  
ancy and thus  prevalence inc reases .  However, a s  Manton p o i n t s  
o u t ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  inc reased  l i f e  expec tanc ies  a r e  
a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  product ive  l i f e  span, t h e  
inc reased  h e a l t h  c o s t s  may be o f f s e t  by g r e a t e r  economic produc- 
t i v i t y .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  accuracy of t h e  "dependency r a t i o s "  i n d i c a t i n g  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  magnitudes of t h e  dependent popula t ions  have been 
quest ioned.  A s  j u s t  d i scussed ,  some of  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
e l d e r l y  popula t ion  could be a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  an i n c r e a s e  i n  
economic p r o d u c t i v i t y .  Furthermore, a b i l i t y  t o  p r e d i c t  changing 
f e r t i l i t y  r a t e s  has  n o t  been impress ive  and even modest changes 
i n  t h i s  r a t e  can have s u b s t a n t i a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  on t h e  s i z e  of  
t h e  suppor t ive  popu la t ion  and t h e  p r e d i c t e d  r e c t a n g u l a r i z a t i o n  
of t h e  popula t ion  pyramid. 
Desp i te  t h e s e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  number 
of  e l d e r l y  w i l l  grow r a p i d l y  and t h a t  even wi thou t  f u r t h e r  
m o r t a l i t y  d e c l i n e s ,  t h e  number of i n d i v i d u a l s  over  age 75 w i l l  
almost  double i n  t h e  nex t  25 yea r s .  These demographic changes 
w i l l  have an impact on bo th  t h e  use  of h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  and t y p e  
of h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  demanded. 
6. F I N A N C I N G  FOR THE AGED 
The major government program f o r  t h e  aged i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  i s  Medicare. I t  i s  a  f e d e r a l  government program t h a t  
c o n s i s t s  of  two p a r t s :  a  compulsory h o s p i t a l  i n su rance  scheme 
( P a r t  A )  and a  vo lun ta ry  supplementary in su rance  scheme ( P a r t  B )  , 
which pays f o r  phys i c i an  s e r v i c e s  and some s e r v i c e s  and s u p p l i e s  
n o t  covered under P a r t  A. P a r t  A has  a  c u r r e n t  d e d u c t i b l e  of 
$260 f o r  t h e  f i r s t  60 days  of  a  h o s p i t a l  s t a y  and $64 f o r  t h e  
nex t  30 days.  P a r t  B has  a  monthly premium o f  $11 and a  c u r r e n t  
d e d u c t i b l e  of $75; it pays 80 p e r c e n t  of covered charges  i n  
exces s  of  t h e  deduc t ib l e .  
Medicare, a long  wi th  Medicaid ( t h e  government program f o r  
t h e  poor)  i s  es t ima ted  t o  pay about  54 p e r c e n t  of  t h e  h e a l t h  
c a r e  expend i tu re s  f o r  t h e  e l d e r l y .  About two- th i rds  of  t h e  
e l d e r l y  a l s o  have p r i v a t e  i n su rance ,  a l though t h i s  on ly  pays 
f o r  a  smal l  s h a r e  of  t h e i r  h e a l t h  b i l l  (about  7  p e r c e n t ) .  The 
remainder i s  paid  by t h e  e l d e r l y  themselves.  Although Medicare 
was never  in tended  t o  cover  a l l  medical  c a r e ,  an i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l  
of concern has  been expressed about  t h e  program's l i m i t e d  scope 
( I g l e h a r t  1982) .  
The c u r r e n t  system i n  t h e  US of f i nanc ing  t h e  e l d e r l y ' s  
heal5h c a r e  i s  under g r e a t  s t r e s s ,  which w i l l  on ly  be exacer-  
b a t e d  by t h e  aging of t h e  populat ion.  One a r e a  of  s t r e s s  
involves the financing of nursing home services. This is not a 
Medicare problem because Medicare essentially is geared toward 
acute care, covering only 2 percent of nursing home expenditures 
in 1979. It is, however, likely to be a Medicaid problem, 
which is a joint federal-state program, and it is of particular 
concern to the states. Medicaid is currently the largest single 
payer of nursing homes (49 percent) with most of the rest being 
paid by the elderly themselves. Attempts are being made to 
control the growth in nursing home expenditures by influencing 
both the reimbursement rates paid to the nursing homes and the 
use of these homes, for example, utilization review, prescreening 
programs, and restricting bed growth and reimbursement. In 
addition some attempts are being made to bring private insurance 
in as a payer and to use new settings for long-term care. 
Despite these various activities it is clear that the increase 
in the number of the old elderly in the next 25 years will place 
immense pressure on nursing homes. 
An even greater and more immediate source of stress involves 
the funding of the Medicare system itself. Although the current 
financial insolvency of the Social Security system is receiving 
more prominent notice in the press, the financial instability 
of the Medicare system is only slightly less serious in the 
short run. In fact, it is being made more serious by short-term 
borrowing from the hospital insurance fund to finance the old- 
age insurance fund. The basic problem for Medicare is that 
hospital expenditures have been growing at a much faster rate 
than the wages used to finance this fund. There are three basic 
approaches that have been suggested to reduce the gap: restricting 
eligibility, increasing funding sources, or reducing the growth 
in expenditures-either by regulation or by trying to foster 
more competition. In fact a successful solution will probably 
require a combination of strategies. The particular combination 
that finally emerges will depend primarily on the political 
process. 
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